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REGULATORY COPYRIGHT
JOSEPH P. LIu*
This Article explores and examines the implications of the increasingly
regulatory nature of U.S. copyright law. For many years, U.S.
copyright law operated under a judicially administered, industryneutral property rights regime. Congress set the scope of the property
entitlement, leaving the courts to enforce the entitlement and the
markets to organize the production of creative works in light of the
entitlement structure. In recent years, however, Congress has shown
an increasing willingness to intervene more directly in the structure of
copyright markets. Congress's most recent legislative efforts are far
more complex and industry-specific, allocate rights and responsibilities
in a far more detailed manner, and in some cases directly regulate
technology and prices in the market. This Article examines and
critically evaluates this trend. It first makes the descriptive claim that
this kind of "regulatory copyright" has become increasingly the
preferred,and indeed perhaps dominant, mode of copyright lawmaking.
It then critically assesses both the strengths and weaknesses of this
approach in the copyright law context. Finally, it offers suggestionsfor
both being more selective in deploying this mode of copyright
lawmaking and improving the function of such lawmaking in cases
where it is deployed.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 88
I. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MODEL .......................................................... 94
94
A. The Early Copyright Acts .....................................................
1. 1790 Act ........................................................................... 94
2. 1790- 1909 ........................................................................ 95
3. 1909 Act ........................................................................... 95
4. 1976 A ct ........................................................................... 98
100
B . Characteristics........................................................................
102
II. THE REGULATORY M ODEL ..................................................................
102
A . Characteristics........................................................................

Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. Email: liujr@bc.edu. Thanks to Michael
Carroll, Julie Cohen, Stacey Dogan, Robert Kasunic, Raymond Ku, Jacqueline Lipton, R.
Anthony Reese, Jay Thomas, Alfred Yen, and the participants at workshops at Georgetown
University Law Center and Case Western Reserve School of Law for helpful comments and
suggestions. Thanks also to Scott Allen for research assistance. © 2004 by Joseph P. Liu.
*

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

88

[Vol. 83

105
The 1976 A ct ...........................................................................
105
1. Industry-Specific Exemptions ............................................
2. Mechanical and Jukebox Compulsory Licenses ................ 108
3. Cable and Satellite Compulsory Licenses .......................... 109
114
C. The 1976 Act Amendments ......................................................
114
1. C O N T U ..............................................................................
2. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 ................................. 116
3. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
119
19 9 5 ............................................
4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ....................... 122
124
5. B roadcast Flag ...................................................................
125
6. Future Proposals .................................................................
126
D. Comparative Scope .................................................................
B.

III. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT ...................................................................
A . Why the Shift? .........................................................................
B . A dvantages..............................................................................
C. Disadvantages.........................................................................
1. General Disadvantages .......................................................
2. Disadvantages as Currently (Partially) Implemented ........

129

IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS ..........................................................................

139

A . Wh en to Deploy .......................................................................
B. How to Improve ......................................................................
1. Substantive Rulemaking Authority ....................................
2. Adjudicatory and Enforcement Authority ..........................
3. Increasing Expertise and Representation ...........................
4. Institutional Alternatives ....................................................
5. O bjections ..........................................................................
CO NCLU SIO N .............................................................................................

129
133
134
134
137
140
147
148
154
156
159
162
166

INTRODUCTION

Copyright law has become very complicated. Every few years, it
seems, Congress enacts another amendment to the copyright law, and each
new amendment seems more complicated than the last. The first Copyright
Act enacted in 1790 was a model of brevity, weighing in at a scant two or
three pages. By 1909, the Act had expanded a bit, now closer to twentyodd pages, yet retaining a certain conceptual simplicity. By 1976,
however, Congress had significantly expanded the Act, reflecting dramatic
changes in technology and the increasing complexity of modem copyright
markets. Subsequent amendments to the 1976 Act have added only more
complexity. Today, the Copyright Act weighs in at more than two hundred
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densely packed pages, nearly one hundred times larger than the original
Act.'
This trend has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the increasing complexity
of the Copyright Act has become the subject of bemusement and concern
among copyright scholars and others. Comparisons to the tax code are
becoming increasingly frequent. 2 Teaching the subject has required less
explication of broad principles in case law and more close reading of
detailed statutory provisions. Many commentators have become concerned
that the complexity of the code is making it more difficult for individuals to
understand and comply with its provisions. 3 Others have lamented the
complexity of certain, very detailed, provisions.4
Despite widespread recognition of the increasing complexity of U.S.
copyright law, until recently relatively little has been written
comprehensively addressing the broader implications of this change. Most
of the existing literature has focused on isolated aspects of this increased
complexity. Jessica Litman, for example, has written about how the
complexity of the Copyright Act makes it difficult for individuals to abide
by its requirements. 5 Robert Merges has analyzed how some of this
complexity is a response to changing technology. 6 Peter Menell has
1. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2-4 (2004) (noting the recent expansion of the Copyright Act);
David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1320 (2004)
(discussing the increased length and frequency of amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act).
2. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers In Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1638 (2003) ("Industry specific rules and exceptions have led to a bloated impenetrable
statute that reads like the tax code."); Shubha Ghosh, The Merits Of Ownership; Or, How I
Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453, 481-82
(2002) (citing an unpublished speech by Professor Alfred Yen); Nimmer, supra note I at 1282
(2004) (commenting that, due to recent detailed amendments, the Copyright Act "exceed[s] the
tax code as a template for involution"); Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFFAIRS,
July-Aug. 2003, at 26 (comparing copyright scholars' attitudes towards the Copyright Act to the
"benign contempt" with which tax scholars regard the tax code).
3. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 25, 29 (2001) [hereinafter LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT]; Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV.
19, 22-23, 38-40 (1996).
4. See, e.g., David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, Part : On the Absurd Complexity of the
Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189 passim (2000) (discussing the
opacity of recent statutes governing digital audio transmissions).
5. See, e.g., LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that, because
copyright rules are constructed by lawyers for particular contexts, they are often difficult to
understand for individuals attempting to apply them to everyday activities); Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 69 OR. L. REV. 275, 312-14 (1989) (noting
that the public is rarely represented in negotiations concerning the development of copyright law).
6. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights And The New Institutional
Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1860 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, New Institutional
Economics]; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law:
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2189-2206 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, One Hundred Years];
see also WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
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suggested that the complexity may result in part from the political
landscape surrounding copyright issues.7 Still others have focused on the
complexity of particular provisions8 or commented in passing on the
increasing complexity of copyright law as a whole.9 Until recently,
however, few commentators have focused sustained critical attention on the
changing character of copyright law as a whole.
This lack of sustained attention to copyright complexity is beginning
to change. Tim Wu, for example, has analyzed many of the recent more
complex provisions of the Copyright Act and has concluded that these
reflect an unstated and largely unexamined "communications policy."10
David Nimmer has also carefully examined the complex new provisions of
the Act, concluding that the quality of copyright legislation, as measured
against certain formal criteria, has declined dramatically in recent years."
This Article contributes to this growing literature by focusing some
critical light on the increasingly regulatory nature of U.S. copyright law
and the implications of this change for existing legal institutions. 2 In this
ENTERTAINMENT 82 (2004) (noting the effects of recent technology on copyright law).

7. See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 180-91, 194-97 (2002); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1,at 22-23 (making a
similar point).
8. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling The Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 673, 687-98 (2003); Nimmer, supra note 4 passim; see also R. Anthony Reese, Copyright
and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies,Possible Solutions, 55 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 237, 240-50 (2001) (examining the complex rules governing internet music
transmissions).
9. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 28 (5th ed. 2001) (suggesting that the
trend toward "Balkanization" in copyright legislation will make it difficult for anyone to
understand the overall statutory scheme); Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology And
Common Law Lawmaking: A Brief Analysis Of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 5 (2000) ("[C]opyright law has become quite complex and much of the
Copyright Act of 1976 reads like a very finely detailed contract."); Kenneth D. Crews, Looking
Ahead and Shaping the Future: Provoking Change in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 549, 550-63 (2001) (analyzing copyright law's trajectory toward increased complexity); I.
Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works and Their
Comparisonfor Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211, 243 n.55 (2001) (stating that
the ongoing re-adjustment of the Copyright Act leads to increased costs); F. Gregory Lastowka,
Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 322-23
(2001) (discussing the complexity of "fair use" and digital copyright law); David Nimmer,
Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA's Commentary, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 988 n.477 (2002) ("It must be admitted that, of late, the Copyright Act
has attracted technically complex amendments even more often than once a year.").
10. Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
Nov. 2004) (arguing that the complexity in copyright reflects copyright's "communications
policy").
11. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1307-26.
12. This Article differs from Wu's article, insofar as it is focused less on the reasons for this
shift to a more complex copyright law and more on the practical implications of the shift, and
specifically how to most effectively administer and implement such a complex law. See Wu,
supra note 10 (forthcoming). Similarly, it differs from Nimmer's article in that it is focused less
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Article, I first make the descriptive claim that U.S. copyright law is
undergoing a fundamental shift in the way it promotes progress through
providing incentives for creation. For many years, U.S. copyright law was
based largely on a judicially administered, industry-neutral property rights
regime.13 Congress was responsible for setting the property entitlement.
The courts were responsible for defining and enforcing the entitlement.
And the markets and private institutions were responsible for organizing
the production of creative works in light of the property rights structure.
The Copyright Office's role was primarily ministerial, registering and
tracking ownership of copyrighted works. 14
In recent years, however, Congress has been much more willing to
intervene in the structure of copyright markets. 5 The 1976 Act departed
from the pure property rights view by introducing detailed, industryspecific exemptions and several complex compulsory licenses for certain
industries. The Librarian of Congress was, for the first time, charged not
only with registering copyrights, but also setting licensing rates, albeit in
only a few industries. Since the 1976 Act, amendments to the Act have
become increasingly more detailed and industry-specific, relying more on
compulsory licenses and, in some cases, mandating adoption of certain
technologies and banning others. The Librarian of Congress's duties have
similarly expanded beyond mere registration, encompassing not only
ratemaking but also substantive rulemaking. Recently proposed legislation,
as well as academic proposals for significantly revamping the copyright
system, also exhibit similar qualities. The trend is such that this mode of
"regulatory copyright" 1 6 is now the dominant mode of copyright
on assessing the quality of complex copyright legislation, and more on the institutional
implications of copyright complexity. See Nimmer, supra note 1,at 1237-39.
13. See infra Part I.
14. Note that I use the descriptive term "property" in the above sense, to denote a rather
broad entitlement enforceable through injunctive relief. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND EcONOMICS 135, 139-44 (2d ed. 1997); Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1089-1115 (1972).
The discussion of "property" in this Article thus focuses
primarily on the nature of the copyright entitlement, and not on the specific makeup of the
entitlement (i.e., whether it should be more expansive or more limited). For discussions about the
rhetorical uses (and abuses) of the term "property" in the intellectual property context, see, for
example, Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 passim
(2000); Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A PropertyParadigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. I (forthcoming Nov. 2004); Adam Mosoff, Is Copyright Property?: A Comment on Richard
Epstein's Liberty vs. Property, at http://www.ssm.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstractjid=491466 (last
visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the
Constructionof the Information Society, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-903 (1997).
15. See infra Part Hl.
16. This Article defines this term in more detail in Part II. Other commentators have used
the term to describe these changes in copyright law. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 197
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lawmaking.
Like the earlier property rights model, this regulatory approach to
copyright has strengths and weaknesses.17 Although the trade-offs between
a judicially administered property rights regime versus a more
interventionist regulatory regime have been widely recognized in other
areas of the law, 8 relatively little attention has been paid to the trade-off in
the copyright context. 9 One strength of the regulatory approach to
copyright is that it permits far more detailed and precise tailoring of rights
and responsibilities in response to specific industry structures. The
approach can thus be used to respond to market failures that might exist
under a pure property rights approach. It also provides parties with more
specificity and clarity. Finally, it often reflects negotiated agreements
between the regulated parties, and is thus politically feasible.
At the same time, the regulatory approach, as currently implemented
in the copyright context, suffers from a number of weaknesses. The
regulatory approach is more complex and therefore more costly to
administer. The complexity makes copyright law less coherent and less
transparent, which increases both the incentive and opportunities for rentseeking by the affected industries. Furthermore, unlike other complex
areas of federal law, agency involvement in substantive copyright
policymaking has been relatively limited, for various historical reasons. As
currently implemented, the regulatory approach in copyright lacks
flexibility, and thus presents the risk of locking in existing industry
structures. The current approach also makes insufficient use of expertise
and empirical data in the policymaking process.
A number of suggestions can be gleaned from this critical assessment
of regulatory copyright.2" First, this analysis offers some guidance
regarding when a regulatory approach may be preferable to a property
rights approach in the copyright context, and vice versa. For example,
where there is a clear case of market failure, where there are relatively
good data, and where the main participants in that industry are easily
identifiable and well-represented, a regulatory approach may have

(sketching out what copyright might look like if treated like a regulated industry); Reza Dibadj,
Regulatory Givings And The Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041, 1055-58 (2003) (analyzing
copyright as a "regulatory giving"); Menell, supra note 7, at 195 (briefly noting the shift from
property rights to regulatory regime).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1329-64 (1998).
19. But cf WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 406-15 (2003) (seeking to explain why copyright protection has
been increasing at the same time as other areas of law have been deregulated).
20. See infra Part IV.
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significant advantages. By contrast, where the case for market failure is
not so clear, where there is significant uncertainty about technology and/or
the future structure of the market, and where there are new entrants, a
property based model may be preferable. This suggests that recent
attempts to apply a regulatory model to digital copyright issues are illadvised.
Second, this assessment suggests ways of improving the function of
regulatory copyright in those cases where it is deployed. 2, Express
recognition of the regulatory nature of modem copyright law suggests
perhaps a greater role on the part of the Copyright Office or some other
administrative body in setting copyright policy in response to the changing
technological and market environment. If the Copyright Office were to
play such a role, significant changes would need to be made to its structure
and responsibilities. In particular, greater technical and economic expertise
would be essential. In addition, changes would need to be made to ensure
broad and effective input, not only from copyright owners, but from other
interests such as technology companies and the public at large. Although
delegating increased authority to the Copyright Office is not without its
drawbacks, such an approach would be superior to the current approach, in
which Congress passes inflexible, detailed, technology-specific legislation
without adequate expertise.
Part I of this Article begins by examining the property rights approach
of the pre-1976 copyright acts. It briefly describes the earlier acts and
identifies a number of common features in both the substantive law and
how that law was implemented. Part II outlines the competing "regulatory
copyright" approach that began to emerge in the 1976 Act and has been
increasingly dominant since then.22 It also identifies the characteristics of
this new approach. Part III offers some tentative explanations for why the
regulatory approach has become increasingly dominant. It then critically
assesses both the strengths and weaknesses of this model as compared to
the earlier model. Part IV focuses on some of the implications of the
analysis. In particular, it proposes guidelines for determining when a
Finally, it offers
regulatory approach may be more appropriate.
suggestions for improving the function of the regulatory approach in those
areas where it is deployed.

21. See id.
22. Nimmer draws a similar (though not identical) distinction between "national copyright
legislation" and "D.C. regulation." Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1290-92. Wu similarly divides the
Copyright Act between provisions directed at authorship and provisions directed at copyright's
"communications policy." See Wu, supra note 10 (forthcoming).
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I. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MODEL

This Part of the Article analyzes the model that characterized the first
150 years of U.S. copyright law. As this Part will show, for much of U.S.
history, U.S. copyright law has limited itself to defining a relatively simple,
industry-neutral property entitlement. The courts subsequently enforced
and elaborated upon the entitlement in a common-law-like manner. The
market and private institutions were then primarily responsible for
organizing the production of creative works in light of the entitlement
structure. The Copyright Office's role was primarily ministerial and
involved little or no substantive policymaking. After providing support for
this descriptive claim, this Part discusses a number of characteristics of the
property rights approach to copyright law.
A.

The Early CopyrightActs
1. 1790 Act

The very first Copyright Act was a model of brevity and simplicity.
Enacted in 1790, the Act contained seven short sections defining the scope
of the copyright entitlement.23 The Act was limited to maps, charts, and
books, and gave authors of these works an exclusive right to print, reprint,
publish, and sell them.24 In order to get the benefit of the exclusive right,
the author had to record title in the work at the clerk's office of the district
court where the author resided.25 The author also had to deposit a copy
with the Secretary of State.26 The Act indicated that the exclusive right
lasted for fourteen years and could be renewed for an additional fourteen
years by re-recording the work.27 The Act also spelled out the penalties
that would apply to any person who violated the exclusive right. And that
was basically it.28
The 1790 Act thus established a rather simple property rights regime
as a way of addressing the public goods problem presented by maps, charts
and books.29 The exclusive right enabled authors of these works to exclude
direct imitators and recoup their initial investment in creative effort. The
entitlement created by the Act was substantively quite straightforward,
covering a specific set of works and barring a specific set of actions. The
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
(1967).

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 125.
Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 125.
Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 124-25.
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 355
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courts were responsible for enforcing the entitlement. The administrative
role was handled by the local district courts, and was limited to recording
the property interest in much the same way that real property interests
might be recorded at a registry of deeds.
2. 1790-1909
From 1790 to 1909, the Copyright Act was amended in a number of
ways, although it retained the same basic structure. First, the subject matter
of copyright was gradually extended beyond maps, charts, and books, to
include prints,3" musical compositions,3 photographs,32 paintings,
drawings, chromolithographs, statues, and works of fine art.33 Exclusive
rights were similarly expanded to include a public performance right for
dramatic34 and musical35 compositions. The original term of copyright
protection was extended as well, from fourteen to twenty-eight years.36
Congress also beefed up the formalities, introducing the notice
requirement37 and deposit with the Library of Congress.38 During this
period, Congress also established the Copyright Office and charged it with
the administrative aspects of the Copyright Act, which at this point were
limited largely to registering copyrights, renewals, and transfers.39
All of these changes were incremental, and none altered the basic
structure of the Act. Despite expansions in subject matter, rights, and term,
the Copyright Act by and large retained its central focus on defining a
relatively industry-neutral property entitlement.
And although the
Copyright Office was established to administer the Act, its role was largely
limited to recordkeeping, again much akin to the role played by a local
registry of deeds or other such agency.
3. 1909 Act
These incremental changes eventually led to the substantial revision of
30. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).
31. Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (amended 1870).
32. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540, 540 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102

(2000)).
33. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 100, 16 Stat. 198, 214 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.

§ 101 (2000)).
34. Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138, 138-39 (repealed 1870).
35. Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481-82 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2000)).
36. Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436-37 (amended 1870).
37. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831).
38. Act of August 10, 1846, ch. 178, § 10, 9 Stat. 102, 106 (repealed 1870).
39. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE: A BRIEF HISTORY AND
OVERVIEW, at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circla.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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the Copyright Act in 1909. The 1909 Act was substantially more complex
than its predecessors and initially contained sixty-four sections.40 The
subject matter of copyright expanded to include not just a limited listing of
copyrighted works, but "all the writings" of an author.4 The exclusive
rights similarly expanded to include not only the rights to "print, reprint,
publish, copy, and vend" the copyrighted work, but also the rights to create
certain derivative works and publicly perform certain works.42 The renewal
term was also extended by an additional fourteen years, so that the
maximum possible term was now fifty-six years.43 Copyright protection
was, moreover, measured not from the date of the filing of title, but from
the date of first publication with notice.'
Despite increasing in complexity, the 1909 Act retained the basic
property rights structure of the earlier Acts. Many of the additional
provisions merely elaborated upon the basic entitlement structure. For
example, many of the additional provisions gave more detailed instructions
about the notice, deposit, and registration requirements and procedures.45
Others provided extensive detail about the substantive and procedural
requirements for infringement actions.46 Still others provided additional
guidance about initial ownership, assignment, and transfers of the
entitlement, along with the attendant recording requirements.4 7 Again, all
of these were consistent with the basic property rights structure.
The 1909 Act also spelled out, in greater detail, the responsibilities of
the Copyright Office. The Act directed the Librarian of Congress to
appoint a Register and Assistant Register of Copyrights.4" The Register
was charged with registering copyrights, accepting deposits of copies of
works, collecting copyright fees, keeping and making publicly available
various records and indices relating to registration, and reporting annually
to the Librarian of Congress regarding these activities. 49 The Register was
also given the power to issue rules and regulations regarding the
registration process.50
Although the 1909 Act spelled out the
administrative role of the Copyright Office in far more detail, its role
40. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
41. Id. § 4, 35 Stat. at 1076. These writings were classified for purposes of registration. Id.
§ 5, 35 Stat. at 1076-77.
42. Id. § l(a), 35 Stat. at 1075.
43. Id. § 23, 35 Stat. at 1080.
44. Id.
45. Id. §§ 12-13, 18-22, 35 Stat. at 1079-80.
46. Id. §§ 25-40, 35 Stat. at 1081-84.
47. Id. §§ 6-8, 35 Stat. at 1077; id. § 41-46, 35 Stat. at 1084-85; id. § 62, 35 Stat. at 1087-

88.
48. Id. § 48, 35 Stat. at 1085.
49. Id. §§ 49, 51, 56, 35 Stat. at 1085-86.
50. Id. § 53, 35 Stat. at 1085.
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remained focused on keeping and maintaining records regarding ownership
of the basic copyright entitlement. Thus, the entire structure of the 1909
Act remained significantly focused upon defining a basic property
entitlement.
The 1909 Act did, however, contain a few notable departures from the
strict, industry-neutral property rights model. First, the 1909 Act was more
industry-specific than previous acts. The exclusive rights varied somewhat
according to the type of work. 5 Moreover, certain exceptions and damage
For example, the Act
limitations were industry- or work-specific.
exempted certain public performances of musical works via coin-operated
machines." It also specified different damages based on the type of work. 3
Although these provisions represented some tailoring of the Act to respond
to certain markets, they constituted very minor exceptions to the broader
property rights structure set up by the 1909 Act.
More significantly, the 1909 Act contained the first industry-specific
compulsory license scheme, the so called "mechanical license."54 This
license was a direct response to the new technology of player-piano rolls,
which posed a threat to the established sheet music industry. Prior to the
1909 Act, the Supreme Court in White-Smith v. Apollo55 had held that piano
rolls were not infringing "copies" of the musical work because the piano
The 1909 Act
rolls were not generally intelligible by humans. 6
legislatively overruled that decision, but at the same time enacted a
compulsory license that permitted piano roll manufacturers to create such
rolls upon payment of a statutorily set fee of two cents per copy to the
original copyright owner of the musical work.57 The copyright owner could
demand a report of such use, due on the twentieth of each month, with the
royalty payment due on the twentieth of the following month. Payment of
the royalty shielded the piano roll manufacturer from further copyright
liability.5 9
The mechanical license is significant because, unlike some of the
minor industry-specific parts of the act mentioned above, the license
represented a significant departure from the property rights model. Instead
51. Id. § 1, 35 Stat. at 1075-76; see also id. § 5, 35 Stat. 1076-77 (listing such categorical
classifications).
52. Id. § 1,35 Stat. at 1076.
53. Id. at § 25(b), 35 Stat. at 1081 (providing fixed damages for the illegal reprinting of
photographs in newspapers).
54. Id. § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075-76.
55. 209 U.S. 1 (1909).
56. Id. at 18.
57. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. at 1076.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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of granting a property entitlement to the original musical work owner and
forcing the piano roll manufacturers to bargain for a license, Congress itself
set the terms of the license and enacted it into the statute. The statute
established the price for the license, the terms of the license, the reporting
procedures, and the penalties for failure to comply with the terms. The
statute thus singled out a specific industry for special treatment and
intervened in that market. The impetus for this special treatment was a
desire to ensure robust competition in the burgeoning piano roll industry, in
light of the dominance of one particular piano roll company.6"
At the end of the day, however, this departure from the property rights
focus of the Copyright Act was limited to a small slice of the copyright
markets. Subsequent amendments to the 1909 Act further departed from
industry-neutrality. For example, the Act was amended in 1971 to
recognize and provide some special treatment for sound recordings.6'
However, these departures from the basic property rights model were rather
limited. In the end, the 1909 Act and its subsequent amendments retained
an overall focus on establishing and detailing the contours of the basic
property entitlement.
4. 1976 Act
As we will see later in this Article, the next major revision of the
Copyright Act in 1976 represented a more significant departure from the
property rights model.62 The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act was a
substantial undertaking by any measure. As early as 1955, Congress
authorized the Copyright Office to begin studying the possibility of
substantially revising the Act in response to dramatic changes in the
copyright industries. 63 The Copyright Office submitted a detailed report to
Congress in 19 6 1.6 After a number of drafts, the first revision bill was
introduced in 1964, followed by extensive hearings.65 Bills were passed by
the House in 1967 and 1976 and by the Senate in 1974 and 1976.66
60. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 65-67 (1994); Loren, supra note 8, at 681; Wu,
supra note 10 (forthcoming).
61. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140 § 1, 85 Stat. 391, 391-92 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. 102 (2000)).
62. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
63. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12 (6th ed. 1986).
64. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961); see PATRY, supra note 63, at 12.
65. PATRY, supra note 63, at 12.
66. See H.R. 2512, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 1361, 93rd Cong. (1974); S. 22, 94th Cong (1976);
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted at 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; PATRY, supra note 63, at
12.
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Differences in the versions were resolved, and the new Act was signed in
1976.67 The process of revision thus took more than twenty years. Much
of the delay resulted from the complexity of the subject matter (in light of
new industries and technologies) and from the need to balance the interests
of many competing industry players.68
The resulting statute was significantly more complex and detailed than
previous copyright acts. The 1976 Act contained several dozen extremely
detailed sections and spanned several hundred pages. As will be discussed
below, a number of these provisions represented rather significant
departures from the property rights model that had, up until this time, been
dominant.
Before discussing these departures, however, it is worth noting that
the 1976 Act nevertheless retained, at its core, many aspects of the property
rights model. 69 The 1976 Act, like the previous acts, defined a basic
property entitlement. The subject matter of copyright was broadly
consistent with the 1909 Act, covering all "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression. ' '7° The Act also listed the
basic rights that entitlement owners could assert, and these too were
broadly similar to (though more expansive than) the rights under the 1909
Act.71 Calculation of the term of protection was changed from a fixed term
of years from the date of publication to the life of the author plus fifty
years.72 Many of the formalities under the previous acts were retained,
though weakened somewhat. The Copyright Office retained its primary
role of registering and keeping records relating to copyrights.73
The 1976 Act also expressly recognized the role that courts had been
playing in helping to define the contours of the entitlement. The Act did so
by codifying the fair use defense,74 which the courts had independently
developed prior to the 1976 Act. Although the earlier copyright acts
expressly mentioned no such defense, courts interpreting these acts created
the defense for certain limited acts of copying.75 The 1976 Act attempted
67. See Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); PATRY, supra note 63, at 12-13.
68. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 870-79 (1987).
69. See Nimmer, supra note 1,at 1256-99 (discussing in detail the basic provisions and
structure of the 1976 Act).
70. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544-45 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(a) (2000)).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
Folsom

Id. § 106, 90 Stat. at 2546.
Id. § 302(a), 90 Stat. at 2572-73.
Id. §§ 701-10, 90 Stat. at 2591-94.
Id. § 107, 90 Stat. at 2546.
The earliest articulation of the fair use defense in U.S. law is generally considered to be
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.).
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to codify the case law by identifying the factors that courts had been
considering, while leaving room for the courts to continue to develop the
defense in a case-by-case manner.76 The 1976 Act thus expressly
recognized the role that courts had been playing in tailoring the scope of
the property entitlement in a common-law-like manner in response to
specific factual situations. This, too, was broadly consistent with a primary
focus on defining a property entitlement.
B.

Characteristics

The property rights model underlying the early copyright acts has a
number of important features from both regulatory and institutional points
of view. First, the model is substantively rather simple.77 That is, the
substantive law of copyright, at least as articulated in the statute, is
relatively straightforward. Under this model, copyright law defines a basic
property entitlement. It sets forth the subject matter covered by copyright
(whether a limited list of certain types of works, or more broadly, all
writings).
It details the basic requirements for protection (whether
registration, publication, or fixation). It sets forth the exclusive rights
given to copyright owners (whether merely to prevent copying, or also
public performances and creation of derivative works), and it sets forth the
penalties for violation of these rights. Thus, the underlying entitlement is
relatively straightforward and easy to understand.
Second, and relatedly, the property rights model is generally industryand technology-neutral. Copyright law under this model defines a property
entitlement that applies equally to all of the works that are subject to
copyright protection. It makes few distinctions between books, music,
sculpture, or other types of works. All works are subject to the same
requirements for protection. All are given broadly (though not entirely) the
same set of exclusive rights.7 8 And all are protected for the same length of
time, despite potentially significant differences in the nature of the
particular markets.79
Third, this model relies upon the courts for implementation and further
articulation of the property entitlement. The substantive simplicity of the
statute does not necessarily mean that the substantive law of copyright is
76. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. at 2546.
77. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1293-98 (assessing the "coherence" of various portions of
the 1976 Act).
78. The main exception to this is the lack of a general public performance right for sound

recordings. See § 106(4), 90 Stat. at 2546.
79. See RALPH BROWN & ROBERT

DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT:
UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND RELATED Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL,
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 487 (7th ed. 1998) (suggesting the possibility of varying terms depending

on the nature of the work).
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simple. Instead, it means that the courts are charged with dealing with any
complexities in the application of the statute.80 The important feature,
however, is that these complexities are not detailed in the code, but are
developed in a case-by-case manner according to more general principles,
quite akin to common law development.8 Thus, the courts are charged
with developing tests and principles for separating protectible expression
from unprotectible ideas,82 for determining when infringement occurs,83 and
for determining when liability should be excused under fair use.84 While a
good deal of substantive complexity can be found in the case law, the caseby-case nature of common law adjudication places a practical limit on the
extent of this substantive complexity.
Fourth, this model relies primarily upon private institutions and
private ordering to organize the production of creative works. Under this
model, copyright law sets the scope of the entitlement and is relatively
agnostic about the details and structure of the resulting market.85 The
distribution of rights and responsibilities among various market players is
not generally determined by the statute. The terms of the licensing
arrangements (including rates and division of rights) are similarly left to the
market.86 Copyright sets the entitlement to solve the public goods problem
and then largely gets out of the way. The assumption is that, once the
entitlement is set, private ordering will ensure that the entitlement is
80. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1292 (describing a terse "national copyright legislation"
with subsequent development by the courts).
81. See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1050-62 (2002)
(describing the "highly successful partnership" between Congress and the courts in the
development and articulation of copyright law).
82. See Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51 (1991) (finding only
thin protection for databases); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880) (developing the
idea/expression dichotomy); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120-21 (2d Cir.
1931) (Hand, J.) (developing the "abstractions test").
83. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992)
(developing the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying infringement analysis to a movie poster
mimicking a drawing by Saul Steinberg).
84. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994) (applying
and adapting fair use defense to parody); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterp., Inc., 471
U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (applying fair use analysis to the publication of excerpts of Gerald Ford's
autobiography); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (crafting a fair
use defense to copyright infringement).
85. Though not completely. The specific structure of the rights will, of course, have an
impact on the structure of markets. For example, the first sale limitation on the right to publicly
distribute copyrighted works means that independent markets for rental and resale can develop
free from direct copyright owner control. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
86. Under this vision, collective rights organizations may play a role in reducing potential
transactions costs. See Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295-97 (1996). Note also
the role of antitrust law in regulating these organizations. See id. at 1340-58.
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efficiently allocated.87
Fifth and finally, under this model, the administrative role of the
Copyright Office is relatively limited. The Copyright Office is charged
primarily with recordkeeping. 8 It registers works, registers renewals and
transfers, accepts deposits, charges fees, and maintains records.89 Its
policymaking power is limited to regulations involving the mechanics of
the above activities.90 And although in limited circumstances it may refuse
to register a work for failure of subject matter,9' these rejections comprise a
relatively small part of the Copyright Office's duties. 92
I.THE REGULATORY MODEL
This Part of the Article develops a model of copyright law that stands
in sharp contrast to the property rights model described in the previous
Part. It starts by defining the characteristics of this contrasting model and
discussing the differences between this "regulatory" model and the
property rights model. It then makes the descriptive claim that Congress
has shown an increasing preference for this regulatory model in its recent
copyright legislation.93 This Part ends by assessing the comparative scope
of these two models of copyright.
A.

Characteristics

Before making the descriptive claim, it is necessary to spend some
time here at the outset describing some of the characteristics of this
competing model of copyright legislation. In other words, exactly what
does this Article mean by the term "regulatory copyright?" 94 In some
sense, the term is too broad, insofar as all copyright legislation "regulates"
87. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 82-

83 (arguing that entitlement allocation should be left to market forces); Merges, supra note 86, at
1301-07 (explaining that private bargaining can be a more efficient means of allocating the
entitlement); see also R.H. Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1,

18 (1959) ("The allocation of resources should be determined by the forces of the market rather
than as a result of government decisions.").
88. See Act of March 4. 1909. ch. 320, §§ 45-61, 35 Stat. 1075, 1087-88.
89.

See id.

90. See id. § 53, 35 Stat. at 1085 (detailing the procedures for filings, etc.).
91. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that registration may be refused if.the subject matter is not copyrightable); 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.1 (2003) (listing material not subject to copyright).
92. During fiscal year 2003, the Copyright Office's Board of Appeals met five times and
heard sixteen requests for reconsiderations of refusals to register. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 9, at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2003/AnnualReport_
2003_Full.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
93. See also Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1320 (describing this shift).
94. For other uses of this term in the context of copyright law, see supra note 16.
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the copyright markets. Even copyright legislation based on the property
rights model described above regulates copyright markets, in the same way
that the substantive law of real property regulates real property markets. 95
Moreover, there are many points on the spectrum between a property rights
view and a more regulatory view. This Article uses the term, however, to
roughly capture the way in which this new model of copyright lawmaking
intervenes more dramatically and more extensively in the markets for
copyrighted works.
By "regulatory," then, this Article means greater legal intervention in
the structure and functioning of a particular market, as illustrated by a
number of different, but related characteristics. The first characteristic is
increased statutory complexity through detailed codification.96 Regulatory
copyright law contains extremely detailed and complex statutory provisions
allocating rights and responsibilities at a very fine-grained and
particularized level.97 Rather than defining a broad property entitlement
and leaving the courts to apply the entitlement in a case-by-case manner,
the regulatory approach seeks to specify the precise results and lay them
out in the statute itself. Thus, regulatory copyright is generally more
detailed and complex.98
Second, regulatory copyright is far more industry- and technologyspecific. The rights and responsibilities of various parties can vary widely
according to the particular type of work or industry at issue. In some cases,
certain types of works might lack certain rights." In other cases, the basic
entitlement structure in a given industry sector might be replaced entirely
by a compulsory license. °° Exemptions also vary substantially depending
upon the type of work. 1°' In places, regulatory copyright can even dictate
the adoption of a technology within certain markets or forbid the
distribution of a technology in other markets. 0 2 Thus, regulatory copyright
is far more context-sensitive and aims to tailor its requirements to specific
95. See Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 passim
(2003) (arguing that copyright has focused on protecting private property and has lost sight of its
regulatory function).
96. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982)
(describing the historical trend toward specificity in codification); Mark D. Rosen, What Has
Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial
Practiceand the Law's Subsequent Development, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1123-24 (explaining
that many areas of the common law have been codified in the past seventy-five years).
97. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1285-99 (calling these portions "D.C. Regulation").
98. Cf Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 12 (1992) (describing a general tendency in the law toward more complexity).
99. For example, sound recordings lack a general public performance ight. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4) (2000).
100. See infra Parts II.B.2 and n.B.3.
101. SeeinfraPartll.B.1.
102. See infra Parts I1.C.2 and II.C.4.
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industries and markets. 0 3
Third, regulatory copyright is willing to intervene far more deeply into
the actual structure of copyright markets. Instead of setting the property
entitlement and largely leaving the market to allocate the distribution of
these entitlements, the regulatory approach seeks to dictate in greater detail
the precise structure and allocation of rights within the market. For
example, in some cases the approach might enact a compulsory license,
dictating the terms of the license (including the price) for an entire industry
or part of that industry.'°4 In other cases, the approach might levy a tax on
certain activities and redistribute the proceeds to other parties.'0 5 In still
other cases, the regulatory approach may affect the technology adopted by
the players in that industry." 6 In all of these cases, copyright law
intervenes far more deeply into the structure of the copyright markets.
Fourth and finally, the approach vests more policymaking power in
Congress and, in some cases, the Librarian of Congress, rather than the
courts.'0 7 Exemptions from liability are spelled out in the statute, rather
than left to the courts for case-by-case development in light of general
principles. These exemptions are often extremely complex and detailed. 8
More generally, the role of the Librarian of Congress (and the Copyright
Office within the Library of Congress) under this approach is far greater.' 9
The new role not only encompasses recordkeeping, but also involves
serving as an expert advisor to Congress on copyright matters (for example,
providing technical advice and reports, and reviewing and drafting
proposed legislation)," 0 rate setting and distribution of funds for certain
compulsory licenses,"' and in some cases even substantive rulemaking." 2
103. See generally Michael Carroll, Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights (May 14, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing in favor of a
more industry-specific approach to copyright).
104. See infra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3.
105. See id. See generally Tom W. Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright As A Statutory
Mechanism For RedistributingRights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229 (2003) (analogizing copyright to
welfare).
106. Thus, although there is much literature on compulsory licensing, compulsory licensing is
a subset of a broader group of market interventions with which this Article is concerned.
107. See infra Parts II.B.3, II.C.3, and H.C.4.
108. See infra Part II.B.I.
109. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-710 (2000) (assigning the Copyright Office more
extensive duties than those previously assigned). The Copyright Office currently employs 500
individuals. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE: A BRIEF
HISTORY AND OVERVIEW, at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circla.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). In the fiscal year 2003, the office registered
534,122 copyrighted works and disbursed more than $65 million from compulsory licenses for
cable broadcasts, satellite broadcasts, and AHRA. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 7,
13.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l). This role predated the 1976 Act, but has increased since then.
11. See infra Parts II.B.2 and II.B.3.

2004]

REGULATORY COPYRIGHT

Thus, when this Article discusses the regulatory turn in copyright law,
it refers broadly to the several related trends described above. Together,
these characteristics stand for an increasing willingness on the part of
Congress to intervene more substantially into the nature and structure of
copyright markets, as opposed to leaving these details to the market.
Having sketched out the broad outlines of this more regulatory approach to
copyright law, the rest of this Part makes the descriptive claim that more
recent copyright legislation has moved toward this model and away from
the earlier, property rights model.
B.

The 1976 Act

As mentioned above, the 1976 Act retained, at its core, the same
property rights model from the preceding copyright acts. However, the
1976 Act also contained a number of notable departures from the property
rights model. In some respects, these parts of the 1976 Act represent a tour
of the portions that are regularly ignored or glossed over in the standard
copyright law course, which still focuses the bulk of its attention on the
parts of the Act that correspond to the traditional, property rights view." 3
Most courses, for example, spend much time exploring the broad principles
underlying Baker v. Selden114 or Feist v. Rural Telephone. 5 Few courses,
by contrast, spend sustained time on the cable or satellite broadcast
compulsory licenses or on the detailed exemptions for libraries and
archives. The lack of sustained focus on these narrower and more detailed
provisions of the 1976 Act may explain why this shift to a regulatory
approach has not attracted more attention.
1. Industry-Specific Exemptions
As an initial matter, even within the framework of a property rights
model, the 1976 Act defined the scope of the basic copyright entitlement in
a far more specific and fine-grained manner. This is most clearly evident
in the detailed exemptions from copyright liability. Although the 1976 Act
retained a broad and straightforward grant of exclusive rights,' 1 6 it
immediately followed this with a number of extremely detailed, complex,
and industry-specific "limitations."" 7 Earlier acts had contained very few
express exemptions from copyright liability, leaving the courts to craft
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000).
113. See Wu, supra note 10 (forthcoming) (noting the same, and arguing that these provisions
represent copyright's unstated "communications policy").
114. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
115. 499U.S.340(1991).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
117. Id.§§ 108-122.
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more via the fair use doctrine. In the 1976 Act, by contrast, these
exemptions played a far more central role in setting the scope of the
entitlement.
For example, the exemption for libraries and archives contains
detailed provisions regarding when libraries can make copies of works in
their collections. 1 8 Rather than setting forth broad standards for the
exemption or leaving the issue to fair use, the statute provides a highly
detailed and specific set of rules. It defines the types of libraries and
archives that can take advantage of the exemption (e.g., libraries or
archives open to the public or available to researchers from a particular
field). 19 It defines the types of works that may be copied.'
It sets forth
the acceptable purposes for making copies (e.g., for preservation,
interlibrary loan, etc.), 2' the number of permissible copies (e.g., only one
or a few copies, depending on the purpose), 2' and other specific conditions
that must be satisfied (e.g., in the case of damaged works, the inability to
find a replacement at a fair price after reasonable effort).' 23
The exemption for certain public performances similarly departs from
the industry-neutral, property rights model. This exemption includes a
detailed list of specific activities that are expressly shielded from copyright
liability.2 4
The public performance right thus does not apply to:
performances for face-to-face teaching activities of nonprofit educational
institutions; 25 performances of certain works in the course of services at a
27
place of worship;2 6 certain performances with no commercial advantage;
certain receptions of broadcasts in a public place; 28 performances of
certain works by "nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization[s]"; 2" 9
performances of musical works by record stores; 30 certain performances
3
for the blind; and performances by veterans or fraternal organizations. ' '
These exemptions are highly targeted, singling out specific groups or
activities for special treatment. Again, this represents a departure from a

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. § 108.
Id. § 108(a).
Id. § 108(b).
Id. § 108(b)-(d).
Id.
Id. § 108(c)(1).
Id. § 110.
Id. § 110(1).
Id. § 110(3).
Id. § 110(4).
Id. § 110(5).
Id. § 110(6).
Id. § 110(7).
Id. § 110(8).
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more industry-neutral, property rights regime. 13 2
Not only are the exemptions industry-specific, they also contain
detailed requirements defining the conditions under which they apply. The
exemption for libraries described above is an example.' 3 3 Another example
is the public performance exemption for the reception of radio broadcasts
in a public place.' 34 This exemption was recently amended in 1998 to
resolve a dispute between the owners of copyrights in musical works and
owners of retail stores and restaurants, who often played radio broadcasts
in their stores.' 35 The resultant compromise is an extremely detailed
exemption, which sets forth extensive requirements for retail
establishments and restaurants. The exemption specifies not only the
nature of the permitted uses, but also such details as permissible square
footage ("less than 2,000 gross square feet of space (excluding space used
for customer parking and for no other purpose)" for retail stores),'36 the
number of speakers and types of receiving equipment ("not more than four
loudspeakers ... located in any one room or adjoining outdoor space"),' 37
and other requirements.
These exemptions thus begin to depart from the industry-neutral,
property rights model of the earlier acts.'38 The exemptions are far more
detailed and complex than the rules that the courts could have crafted under
the fair use defense, establishing very specific requirements rather than
relying upon broader standards and principles. The exemptions are also far
more industry-specific, expressly singling out specific types of works,
specific industries, and specific uses of copyrighted works for special
treatment. These exemptions are also enacted expressly into the statute
itself, rather than left to the courts for case-by-case development. As will
be discussed more extensively below, these detailed exemptions resulted
from political compromises hammered out by the relevant industries in the
132. Note that some of these performances would have been exempt under the 1909 Act, as
that Act limited the public performance right to "for profit" performances. Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (repealed 1976). The 1976 Act expanded the property
entitlement to include non-profit performances, then enacted the detailed exemptions listed above.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
134. Id. § 110(7).
135. See Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (2000)); Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A
Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairnessin Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93,
187-90 (2000).
136. Fairness in Musical Licensing Act § 202(a)(1)(B), 112 Stat. at 2830.
137. Id.
138. Other exemptions include exemptions for making and transferring copies of computer
software, 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117; certain limitations on the rights associated with pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, id. § 113; exemptions for noncommercial broadcasters, id. § 118;
limitations on rights for architectural works, id. § 120; exemptions for reproduction for persons
with disabilities, id. § 121.
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drafting of the 1976 Act. They thus represent an attempt to establish clear
rules, balancing the interests of the relevant parties.
At the same time, the exemptions standing alone represent a relatively
limited departure from the property rights view. To some extent, detailed
codification is not necessarily inconsistent with a property rights model. It
might be quite possible to have a property entitlement that exhibits a high
degree of statutory complexity, leaving the markets to allocate distribution
of that entitlement. If the 1976 Act had limited itself solely to defining the
exemptions in a more detailed fashion, it might fall more squarely within
the traditional property rights model. However, the 1976 Act contained
additional provisions that pushed beyond simply greater specificity, and
these detailed exemptions should be understood in light of these additional
provisions.
2. Mechanical and Jukebox Compulsory Licenses
More significantly, from a regulatory point of view, the 1976 Act
made greater use of compulsory licenses and established them more firmly
as an alternative to a property entitlement. The mechanical license from
the 1909 Act was preserved, largely in the same form (though with greater
detail and some slight modifications), in the 1976 Act.'39 By this time, of
course, the relevant technology was not piano rolls but sound recordings on
record albums and tapes. 140 Thus, once a musical work owner had
authorized distribution of a sound recording, other artists could record and
distribute copies of that musical work upon payment of a statutorily set
licensing fee. 14 1 It is interesting to note that, despite the compulsory license
procedure set forth in the statute, private parties often bargain around the
42
statutory compulsory license, reaching their own terms and conditions.
This indicates that, although the 1976 Act intervened in the market by
setting up a compulsory licensing scheme, the parties could nevertheless
bargain around it.
The 1976 Act also contained a similar compulsory license for jukebox

139. Id. § 115.
140. Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Good-Bye to Madonna'sAmerican Pie: Why
Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285,
289 (2001).
141. The rate is currently set at $.085 per work embodied in the phonorecord or $.0165 per
minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever is greater. See 37 C.F.R § 255.3(I) (2003).
142. See Loren, supra note 8, at 696. See generally lan Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027,
1037-38 (1995) (noting that liability rules can sometimes facilitate bargaining); Ralph Oman, The
Compulsory License Redux: Will it Survive in a Changing Marketplace?, 5 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 37 (1986) (charting the rise of the compulsory license).
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operators.143 Under the original 1909 Act, performances by coin-operated
machines were exempted from liability entirely. In the 1976 Act, such
performances were subject to a statutory compulsory license.' 1 Later
amendments to the Act replaced the statutory license with a preference for
a negotiated license.'45 However, in the absence of a negotiated license, the
license is set through arbitration by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal (later
replaced by Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels) under the supervision of
the Librarian of Congress. 4 6 The function and role of these royalty-setting
institutions will be discussed in more detail below, but for present
purposes, it is important to note that the Act carved out another compulsory
license for coin-operated music-playing devices such as jukeboxes.
3. Cable and Satellite Compulsory Licenses
Although both of the compulsory licenses described above departed
from the property rights model, they did so in rather straightforward ways,
defining a relatively simple compulsory license structure. The same cannot
be said for the cable broadcasting compulsory license.' 47 Responding to the
advent of a new industry, the 1976 Act contained an exceptionally complex
compulsory license provision, which enabled cable television providers to
re-transmit broadcast television signals. The provision was the result of a
compromise hammered out between the broadcast and cable industries. 4 "
The compulsory license scheme ultimately ensured that cable companies
would be able to provide their customers with access to broadcast

143. 17 U.S.C. § 116. See generally Scott M. Martin, The Berne Convention and the U.S.
Compulsory License for Jukeboxes: Why the Song Could Not Remain the Same, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 262 (1990) (describing the compulsory license requirements for
jukebox operators); Marilyn S. Wise, Trials Of The Tribunal: Toward A Fair Distribution Of
Jukebox Royalties, 16 Sw. U. L. REv. 757 (1986) (same).
144. Though apparently this compulsory license was widely disregarded. See Loren, supra
note 8, at 7-11.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 116.
146. Id. § 116(b)(2).
147. Id. § I 11. Note that this provision also exempted certain re-transmissions by non-cable
companies, e.g., retransmission via cable by a hotel or apartment building to the residents of the
building. § 1 l(a)(1).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704,
stating:
The Committee believes that cable systems are commercial enterprises whose basic
retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material and
that copyright royalties should be paid by cable operators to the creators of such
programs. The Committee recognizes, however, that it would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner
whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.
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television, while still compensating the broadcast industries."
The resultant legislation was extremely complex and detailed. The
compulsory license imposes extensive reporting requirements on cable
companies. 5 Every six months, cable companies are required to file a
statement of account with the Copyright Office setting forth the number of
cable channels rebroadcasting the signals, the names of the broadcast
stations they were retransmitting, total number of subscribers, gross
amounts paid to the cable companies resulting from retransmission, and
any other data the Copyright Office requires."' The statute then sets forth
the specific royalty rate that the cable companies must pay, based on gross
receipts from customers, for various acts of re-transmission. 52 The cable
company must deposit any fees due under the compulsory license with the
Copyright Office.15 3 The statute then sets up a separate procedure for
distributing the proceeds to the copyright owners."' Copyright owners
whose shows were re-transmitted under the compulsory license can file
claims for royalties in July of every year. 5 5 Every August, the Copyright
Office determines whether there is any controversy over how the funds
should be distributed,'56 If any such controversy exists, the matter is then
Panel for resolution.' 57
transferred to a Copyright Arbitration Royalty
51
Decisions are then subject to judicial review.
The cable compulsory license thus represented an even more
significant departure from the industry-neutral, property rights regime.'5 9
149. See generally C. H. Dobal, Note, A Proposal To Amend The Cable Compulsory License
Provisions Of The 1976 Copyright Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 699 (1988) (detailing the statutory
requirements of the 1976 Act that allow cable companies to retransmit television broadcast
signals).
150. § l11(d)(l)(A).
151. § III(d).
152. For example, the royalty rate could be 0.5 of one per centum of gross receipts. See
§ 1 I(d)(1)(C)-(D). This rate is subject to periodic adjustment. See Nat'l Cable Television
Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077, 1080 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
153. § ll (d)(1)(B).
154. § 1ll(d)(4).
155. § ll(d)(4)(A).
156. The statute expressly states that the parties may themselves agree to a distribution of the
royalties. § I1l (d)(4)(B).
157. Id. Under the 1976 Act, these decisions were made by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal,
the institutional predecessor of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels. Act of Oct. 19, 1976,
Pub. L. No.94-553, ch. 8,§ 801(3), 90 Stat. 2541, 2596.
158. See generally Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v.Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 1289 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (reviewing a decision of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel); Cablevision Sys.
Dev. Co. v.Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 836 F.2d 599 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (same); Nat'l Cable
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same);
Christian Broad. Network, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 720 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(same).
159. Oman, supra note 142, at 44 ("In examining the history of copyright in the United States
over the last twenty years, one might reasonably conclude that the largest economic shift in
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Here, the statute expressly singled out a particular industry for special
treatment. It further dictated the very detailed terms of the compulsory
license, including detailed reporting provisions, special definitions, and fee
schedules. In many ways, the text of the provision reads like a private
licensing agreement struck between private parties (which it in effect was,
albeit one enacted into law by Congress). 6 ' Indeed, much of the
terminology in the provision would be entirely opaque to anyone not
familiar with the details of the industries at issue.' 6' Moreover, unlike
some of the previous compulsory licenses, the fees were not paid directly to
the copyright owners. Instead, the Copyright Office pooled the receipts
and redistributed the amounts to copyright owners in response to specific
claims, with disputes being resolved by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels. In all these respects, the provision intervenes much more directly
into the details of a particular market.
The 1976 Act was later amended to include similar compulsory
licenses for satellite retransmissions of broadcast television.162 These
provisions rival, if not exceed, the cable compulsory license in complexity.
The provisions share many of the same characteristics as the cable63
television compulsory license such as extremely detailed conditions,
reporting requirements,' 64 rate setting by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels, 165 provisions for redistribution of royalties, 66 and separate
definitions. 6 7 These provisions further contain even more detailed
provisions tailored to the specifics of the satellite broadcast industry,
copyright policy occurred when Congress created this license.").
160. See Litman, supra note 68, at 869.
161. For example, one section reads, in part:
Except in the case of a cable system whose royalty is specified in subclause (C) or (D), a
total royalty fee for the period covered by the statement, computed on the basis of
specified percentages of the gross receipts from subscribers to the cable service during
said period for the basic service of providing secondary transmissions of primary
broadcast transmitters, as follows: (i) 0.675 of I per centum of such gross receipts for
the privilege of further transmitting any nonnetwork programming of a primary
transmitter in whole or in part beyond the local service area of such primary transmitter,
such amount to be applied against the fee, if any, payable pursuant to paragraphs (ii)
through (iv); (ii) 0.675 of 1 per centum of such gross receipts for the first distant signal
equivalent; (iii) 0.425 of I per centum of such gross receipts for each of the second, third,
and fourth distant signal equivalents ....
17 U.S.C. § 11 l(d)(l)(B).
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (general satellite retransmission license); § 122 (local-to-local
satellite retransmission license).
163. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 19(a)(1)-(2), 122(a).

164. Id. §§ 19(b)(1)(A), 122(b).
165. Id. § 119(c)(3)(B).
166. Id. § 119(b)(4).
167. Id. §§ 119(d), 1220).
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including: detailed distinctions between types of initial broadcast feeds
that are subject to the license; 6 ' detailed geographical limitations (for
"unserved households," along with specific measures to calculate when
such households are unserved); 69 separate penalties for violation of certain
terms of the license; 70 ways of measuring signal intensity; 17' and even
sections governing application to recreational vehicles and commercial
trucks. 72 The satellite retransmission compulsory license thus represents
an even clearer example of the regulatory approach.
It is worth noting, with all of these compulsory licenses, the
increasingly prominent role of the Librarian of Congress and, specifically,
the Copyright Office and the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels. With
any compulsory license, some entity must set the rate, as the market no
longer does so (as it would under a pure property rights regime). 17 In some
cases, the rate is set by the statute. 174 In other cases, the statute delegates
that responsibility to a rate-setting institution under supervision of the
Librarian of Congress. 75 Originally, the 1976 Act vested this power in a
permanent administrative body, the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. 76 Later,
the power was vested in ad hoc Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels
convened by the Librarian of Congress."' In either case, the statute gives
168. Id. § 119(a)(1)-(2).
169. Id. § 119(a)(2)(B).
170. Id. § 119(a)(3)-(5).
171. Id. § 119(a)(8).
172. Id. § 119(a)(11).

173. The general advantages and disadvantages of compulsory licenses have been debated
extensively elsewhere, see generally Merges, supra note 86; Robert P. Merges, Of Property
Rules, Coase, And Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2655 (1994); Darlene A. Cote, Note,
Chipping Away At The Copyright Owner's Rights: Congress' Continued Reliance On The
Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994). For present purposes, I am less interested

about the merits of the debate, and more interested in the regulatory implications once the Act
recognizes some compulsory licenses.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (2000). Note that, although the initial rate for this compulsory
license was set in the statute itself, the rate was subject to adjustment by the Librarian of
Congress. See Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat.
2304 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(l)-(b)(2) (2000)). The current rate can be found at 37
C.F.R. § 255.3(1) (2003).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
176. The actions of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal were subject to significant criticism and
litigation. In particular, the statute provided little guidance regarding how royalties were to be
distributed, leading to much litigation. See, e.g., Nat'l Assoc. of Broadcaster v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 772 F.2d 922, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (describing how the regulations as
published easily confused parties); Christian Broad. Network v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 720
F.2d 1295, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); Nat'l Cable Television Assoc. v. Copyright Royalty
Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). Much of this criticism led to
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
177. Pub. L. No. 103-198, § 2, 107 Stat. 2304, 2304-08 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 802(a)-(b)
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an administrative body the power to set prices in a particular market for
certain types of licenses. In some cases, the administrative body is also
charged with accepting and holding royalty payments in a centralized
manner, and then disbursing payments to copyright owners in response to
filed claims.178
The responsibilities of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels are
expressly set forth in a separate chapter of the Copyright Act.17 9 The
Librarian of Congress is authorized to appoint and convene such panels,
upon recommendation of the Register of Copyrights.18 ° The panels are then
charged with setting "reasonable copyright royalty rates" for the applicable
compulsory licenses, and in doing so are asked to further various
objectives, such as: maximizing the availability of creative works to the
public; affording copyright owners a fair return; and minimizing the
disruptive impact on existing industry structures. 18' The panels are also
charged with resolving disputes over distribution of royalty proceeds to
copyright owners. 18' This section also contains detailed provisions on the
selection and payment of arbitrators, as well as procedures for conducting
arbitrations. The panels thus act in both a rate setting context and in an
adjudicatory context.183
The 1976 Act thus set up an ongoing administrative structure to deal
with rate setting for compulsory licenses. In so doing, the Act established a
clear, alternative structure for dealing with copyright regulation, a structure
that Congress would subsequently utilize in regulating other copyright
industries."8 In addition to the compulsory licenses already mentioned
above, the 1976 Act contained a compulsory license for public broadcast
(2000))
178.
179.
180.
181.

(describing the functions and procedures of the copyright arbitration royalty panels).
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(3).
17 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
Id. § 801(b)(1).
Id.

182. Id. § 801(a)(3).
183. Note the pending Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 1417,
108th Cong. (2003), which seeks to reduce costs and improve administrative efficiencies of the
CARPs. See also Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R.
1417 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,and Intellectual Prop.of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 59-60 (2003) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights

and Associate Librarian, Library of Congress) (detailing high administrative costs of the existing
system, and in particular the institutional burden imposed by the ad hoc nature of the panels);
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 30-37 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate
Librarian, Library of Congress) (detailing history of CARPs and suggesting improvements);
Stuart M. Maxey, Note, That CARP Is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty PanelsChange Is Needed, Here Is Why, And How, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 385, 390-92 (2003) (detailing
the current CARP structure and process).
184. See Oman, supra note 142 passim (charting rise of the compulsory license).
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stations, with rates established by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.' 85
Future amendments to the Act would also take advantage of this alternate
structure. So, for example, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 made
use of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.'86 More recently, the new digital
performance right for sound recordings uses the structure of compulsory
licenses.' 87 Both of these provisions will be discussed in more detail
below.
C.

The 1976 Act Amendments

In many ways, the 1976 Act was a hybrid act. At its core lay the
original property rights model of the earlier copyright acts. On top of this
core, however, the Act grafted on more detailed, industry-specific
exemptions.' 88 More significantly, it displaced the property rights model
entirely in parts of a few select industries (e.g., mechanical license, cable
television, public broadcasting). Although the substantive coverage of
these industries was still relatively limited (certainly as compared to the
industries still dominated by the property rights model), the compulsory
license structure set up an alternative framework for future legislation.
As we will see below, many of the major amendments since the 1976
Act have taken advantage of this framework and increasingly adopted a
regulatory model. Indeed, the size and complexity of the Copyright Act
has dramatically increased in the years since 1976, and these amendments
are primarily responsible for this trend. 8 9 Moreover, recent proposals for
further amendments to the act have adopted this more regulatory approach.
1. CONTU
First, however, it is worth noting an exception to the trend, namely the
amendments to the 1976 Act that were designed to adapt the Act to new
computer technologies. During the substantial work that went into the
drafting of the 1976 Act, it became increasingly apparent that advances in
photocopying and computer technology would have a dramatic impact on
the copyright markets, and that the revised Act should take account of these
changes. At the same time, the drafters recognized that much of the
substantial work that had already been put into the revision might be put in

185. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2000).
186. See id. §§ 1001-1007.
187. Id. § 114.
188. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1292. Nimmer calls the simple core "national copyright
legislation" and the more complex portions "endless D.C. regulations." Id.
189. Note that the following survey of amendments to the 1976 Act is selective, and does not
discuss all amendments to the Act. For a more comprehensive survey of amendments to the 1976
Act, see generally Nimmer, supra note 1.
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jeopardy if it had to be re-opened to take into account the complex issues
presented by new technology. As a result, new issues presented by new
computer technologies were temporarily tabled and handed over for study
by a congressional commission expressly set up to consider the potential
impact of technology on copyright: the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). 9 °
Established in 1974, CONTU was charged with the task of studying
these new technologies and issuing recommendations to Congress for
amending the Copyright Act. The commission consisted of various experts
from the relevant fields of law and technology. After four years of study,
CONTU issued its final report in 1978, along with specific
recommendations for amendments to the 1976 Act.' 9 ' Hearings were held
in the House in 1980, and legislation was subsequently passed
implementing modified versions of the recommendations.' 92
In its final report, CONTU recommended that only minor changes be
made to the Copyright Act to account for new computer technology. The
baseline conclusion was that existing copyright laws were up to the task of
dealing with new challenges presented by computer technology and in
particular computer software. CONTU recommended that the Act be
amended to expressly recognize computer software as a "literary work"
subject to copyright protection.' 93 In addition, CONTU recommended
certain minor changes to give owners of copies of software the right to run
software on their computers, make backup copies, and transfer copies to
third parties. 94 Other than these minor adjustments, however, CONTU
concluded that new types of works like software should generally be
subject to the same basic structure of copyright protection as other works.
The courts, then, would be left with the task of applying existing copyright
principles to these new works in a case-by-case fashion.
The CONTU approach is notable here for its reliance on the property
rights model of copyright regulation.' 95 Rather than propose a complex
statutory scheme (complete with detailed provisions) to deal specifically
190. See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs,Databases, And
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 979
(1993); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection For
Computer ProgramsIn Machine-ReadableForm, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663, 665.
191. NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 1-2

(1978) [hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT].
192. Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000)).
193. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 191, at 15-16.
194. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 191, at 12-15; 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
195. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1326 (citing CONTU as an example of good copyright
policymaking).
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with computer software, CONTU consciously chose to bring computer
software within the general scope of the basic copyright entitlement. In
part, this reflected a view that existing copyright principles were sufficient
to deal with the challenges presented by computer software. In part, this
also reflected an acknowledgement that the commissioners lacked good
hard data on how this nascent industry would eventually play out. CONTU
thus left the case-by-case application of the law to the courts, which over
the next several decades adapted existing copyright principles to the special
case of computer software.1 96
Whether this approach was the proper approach is an issue that has
generated much discussion and one that is beyond the scope of this
Article.'97 It is important to note here, however, that the approach adopted
by CONTU in response to new technology reflected, in many ways, an
adherence to the property rights model rather than the expressly regulatory
model.
2. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
Congress adopted a very different approach when faced with new
digital recording technology. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the
successful introduction of the compact disc, the consumer electronics
industry was about to introduce digital audio tape technology, which would
permit consumers for the first time to make digital copies of recorded
music. The music industry, fearing the piracy potential presented by a
technology that could make perfect copies, filed suit against the consumer
electronics manufacturers on grounds of contributory liability.'98 The result

196. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding
that the menu command hierarchy in question was an uncopyrightable method of operation);
Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (creating the abstractionfiltration-comparison test for infringement of computer software); Sega Enterp. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1528 (9th Cir. 1992) (using fair use to craft an exemption for certain acts of
reverse engineering); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d
Cir. 1983) (finding copyrightable computer operating systems); see also Stacey Dogan & Joseph
Liu, Copyrightand Subject-Matter Specificity: The Case of Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN.

SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming Jan. 2005) (discussing judicial adaptation of copyright law to
computer software).
197. See CONTU FINAL REPORT (Dissent of Commissioner Hersey), supra note 191, at 2737; Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual PropertyProtectionfor Computer

Software, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2644, 2644 (1994); Miller, supra note 190, at 990-97; Samuelson,
supra note 190, at 665-69; Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protectionof Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2365 (1994).

198. See Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1990); Lewis
Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act Of 1992 And The
Formation Of Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 497, 449-501 (1998); Gary S.
Lutzker, Note, Dat's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991Merrie Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 146 (1992).
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was to delay introduction of the new technology, as there was much
uncertainty surrounding how the courts would apply the rule from Sony v.
Universal City Studios,199 the Supreme Court decision that permitted
continued sale of the VCR.2 0
In order to break the deadlock, representatives of both industries
negotiated a compromise, which Congress subsequently enacted into law as
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).201 The Act immunized
consumers from direct liability for making personal copies of recorded
music and device manufacturers from indirect liability for selling digital
audio tape decks.2"2 In exchange, the Act required device manufacturers to
place in their devices technologies to prevent serial copying of recorded
music. 2 3 This technology would permit consumers to make a digital copy
of recorded music, but would prevent consumers from making subsequent
digital copies from the initial copy. The Act also imposed a levy on the
sale of every digital audio recording device (two percent of the "transfer
price" as defined in the statute) and on any blank audio medium (three
percent of the transfer price) used to make such recordings. 2 °0
The
proceeds from the levy would then be redistributed by the Copyright Office
to the owners of copyrights in the sound recordings (66 2/3%) and musical
works (33 1/3%), and within those groups according to negotiated
settlements or, in the absence of such, by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panel.205
The AHRA represented a significant extension of the regulatory
copyright approach in a number of respects.20 6 First, the AHRA's royalty
did more than simply set up a compulsory license. In previous compulsory
licenses, the Act tied payment of the license directly to actual use of the
underlying copyrighted work (whether in a "cover," in a jukebox, or over a
cable or satellite broadcast).2 7 In the AHRA, by contrast, the royalty was
tied, not to direct use of the underlying copyrighted work, but to the sale of
devices and products that could be used to engage in copying the
underlying copyrighted works. Thus, the AHRA essentially imposed a tax
199. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
200. Id. at 442-56. A similar unsuccessful attempt was made to impose a compulsory license
scheme on the VCR. See S. 31, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong. (1983).
201. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 2, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
203. Id. § 1002.
204. Id. §§ 1003-1004.
205. Id. § 1006.
206. Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1331 ("The AHRA is a forbidding jungle of arbitrary
specifications; it marks the turning point, in fact, of Title 17 from a potentially comprehensible
embodiment of copyright doctrine into the hopeless mishmash that it has become.").
207. See supra Parts II.B.3 & II.B,4.
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or levy on a separate, though related, market for redistribution to copyright
holders.
Second, the distribution provisions were more complex. With the
cover license, the royalties were due directly to the owners of the works
that were actually used."°8 Similarly, with the satellite and cable licenses,
royalties are due to owners of works that were actually used, although in
this case, the owners themselves had to file claims against a pool of
collected royalties."° Under the AHRA, however, no mechanism existed to
directly monitor which works were being copied by consumers.21 0
Accordingly, distributions to parties within each of the relevant groups of
owners were to be made according to certain proxies: sales of recorded
music (for both the sound recording and musical work owners) and
numbers of broadcasts (for musical work owners).2"1' Thus, distribution of
the proceeds involved more complexity.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the AHRA for the first time
expressly regulated technology within a particular market. The AHRA
essentially contained a technology mandate for digital recording devices,
requiring that such devices implement a specific, then existing technology
(i.e., "Serial Copyright Management System") or a system that had "the
same functional characteristics. '212 Devices that did not contain this
technology were essentially banned. Attempts to sell or import nonconforming devices would subject individuals to liability under the
AHRA.2 13

In these ways, the AHRA departed dramatically from the property
rights model. The AHRA intervened in the structure of not just a copyright
industry (i.e., the music industry), but also a related consumer electronics
industry. It imposed a royalty not on the use of a copyrighted work, but on
the sale of related goods for later redistribution to copyright owners. And it
mandated the adoption of a specific technology in that market. In all these
ways, the AHRA bore scant resemblance to the industry-neutral, courtadministered property rights regime of the earlier Acts. Moreover, the
AHRA represented an extension of the regulatory model beyond just a
limited slice of the copyright market (as in the case of cable or satellite
television), to encompass a greater portion of the copyright market (i.e.,
208. See supra Part II.B.2.
209. See supra Part II.B.3.
210. In this respect, the problem resembles that faced by collective rights organizations, such
as ASCAP and BMI, which must find ways of monitoring and approximating the public
performance of a large number of musical works by a large number of companies.
211. That is, unless the parties could reach a more desirable agreement among themselves. 17
U.S.C. § 1006 (2000).
212. Id.§ 1002.
213. Id.§ 1008.
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recorded music and consumer electronics).
3. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
A short three years after the AHRA, Congress again intervened in the
market for music copyrights, this time with the exceptionally complex
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRSRA)." 4
Earlier, in 197 1, Congress had added sound recordings to the list of works
protected by copyright.215 However, sound recording owners did not obtain
the exclusive right to control public performances.2 16 This was due largely
to the lobbying power of the broadcast industries, which did not want to
have to pay an additional royalty (beyond the one due to the owners of the
musical works) for broadcasting recorded music.2" 7 With the advent of
digital technology, the sound recording copyright owners voiced concerns
that digital delivery of sound recordings via cable, satellite, and the internet
might significantly cut into the market for sales of sound recordings. In
response, Congress enacted the DPRSRA, granting sound recording owners
a limited right to control digital public performances.2" 8
The DPRSRA, both in its initial form and as later amended,219 is quite
possibly the most complex copyright provision yet enacted.22 ° In size, the
provision rivals the entire 1909 Copyright Act. In detail, the terminology
and specificity make the provision almost entirely opaque to someone who
is not familiar with the relevant industries. As an initial matter, the
DPRSRA simply amends the list of exclusive rights to give sound
recording owners this additional right to control digital public
" ' However,
performances.22
the Act then subjects the new right to a number
of extremely complex exemptions and compulsory licenses, encompassing
214. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
215. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140 § 1, 85 Stat. 391, 391-92 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).
217. See Loren, supra note 8, at 686.
218. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright And Control Over New Technologies Of Dissemination,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1630 (2001).
219. This Act was itself later amended by Title IV of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 401-407, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887-2905 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), and by the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 114 (2003)). See Nimmer, supra note 1, at
1336-42. Subsequent references to the DPRSRA in the text above should be read to refer to both
the initial enactment and subsequent amendments.
220. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1336 ("The DPRA is a masterpiece of incoherence.");
Nimmer, supra note 4, at 189 ("When Congress decided to plug the historical anomaly under
which sound recordings lacked any performance right, it could have acted very simply. Instead it
gave birth to Frankenstein.").
221. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
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digital performances, temporary digital copies, and digital covers.
A comprehensive description of the DPRSRA is beyond the scope of
this Article.222 However, it is worth highlighting a number of the main
provisions to illustrate the complexity of this enactment. First, certain noninteractive, non-subscription digital transmissions are exempted (subject to
a number of complex qualifications).22 3 Thus, for example, non-interactive
digital radio broadcasts of recorded music are not generally subject to the
digital public performance right (although they remain subject to the
general public performance right for musical works).224 Second, certain
interactive, subscription digital transmissions are fully subject to the digital
performance right.225 Thus, for example, providers of internet music on
demand must negotiate directly with the sound recording owners for a
license.226
Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this Article, certain
non-interactive digital transmissions (e.g., through "webcasting") are
subject to a complex statutory compulsory license scheme. 22 7 The statute
sets forth a number of highly specific categories of transmissions subject to
the compulsory license scheme, with extensive requirements, subrequirements, and exceptions (covering such details as extent of
performances, publication of program information, duration of
performances, compliance with copy-protection technologies, etc.). 22' The
statute indicates a preference for voluntarily negotiated licensing rates and
terms.229 In the absence of agreement, however, actual licensing rates and

222. For such descriptions, see Loren, supra note 8, at 703-05 (advocating that the copyright
system be changed with regard to the music industry); Steven M. Marks, Entering The Sound
Recording Performance Right Labyrinth: Defining Interactive Services And The Broadcast
Exemption, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309, 309-15 (2000) (arguing that the DPRSRA is
inadequate to address problems created by Internet music services); Nimmer, supra note 4, at
189-94 (comprehensively analyzing the digital public performance right); Reese, supra note 8, at
241-44 (comprehensively examining the legal structure surrounding online music); Les Watkins,
The Digital Performance Right In Sound Recordings Act Of 1995: Delicate Negotiations,
Inadequate Protection, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 323, 328-33 (1996) (discussing the
asserted shortcomings of the DPRSRA); Derek M. Kroeger, Comment, Applicability of the
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 73, 77-78
(1998) (discussing the applicability of the DPRSRA); A. Dustin Mets, Note, Did Congress
Protect The Recording Industry Into Competition? The Irony Of The Digital Performance Right
In Sound Recordings Act, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 371, 372-76 (1997) (describing the DPRSRA
as granting the artist a limited right to control public performances and recordings).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(l) (2000).
224. Id.
225. Id. § I 14(e)(l). See Loren, supra note 8, at 692.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).
227. Id. § 14(d)(2); Loren, supra note 8, at 692-93.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2).
229. Id. § 114(f)(l)(A).
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terms are to be set by a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel.23° The statute
provides a detailed procedure (including notice in the Federal Register) for
the setting of such rates and terms.' It also gives the Copyright Office the
authority to establish the kinds of reporting requirements necessary to
ensure compliance with the licenses.232 The statute then states that an agent
designated to distribute receipts of the licensing revenues shall distribute
the receipts according to a statutory formula to owners of the digital
performance right (fifty percent), recording artists (forty-five percent), and
to various escrow accounts for non-featured musicians (2.5%) and nonfeatured vocalists (2.5%).233
The DPRSRA thus presents perhaps the most dramatic application of
the regulatory approach. In this case, the Copyright Act is extensively
involved in the shape and structure of a particular copyright market,
namely the market for digital performances of recorded music. Rather than
leaving the market to be structured according to private agreements
(whether individually or by collective rights organizations), the Act steps in
and enacts an extremely detailed compulsory license structure, with
extremely detailed qualifications and definitions. Although it shows an
initial preference for a negotiated license between industry players, it
ultimately gives a copyright arbitration panel the power to dictate the terms
and conditions (including fees) of the resulting licenses for that industry.
Finally, it dictates how the proceeds of the compulsory license are to be
split up by various interested parties. Again, this is a significant departure
from the original, property rights view.
230. Id. § 114(f)(1)(B).
231. Id.
232. Id. § 114(f)(4)(A).
233. Id. § 114(g)(2). As required by statute, the Librarian of Congress initiated proceedings
for setting the terms and rates of the compulsory license. In accordance with the DPRSRA, the
Librarian published notice in the Federal Register of voluntary negotiations by interested parties.
See Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed. Reg. 77, 292 (Dec. 11, 2000); see also
Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 779-85 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (upholding the
Copyright Office's interpretation of the statutory exemption). It then convened a Copyright
Arbitration Royalty Panel and charged it with the task of setting licenses. See 64 Fed. Reg. 52,
107 (Sept. 27, 1999); Copyright Office Final Rule on New Webcasting Royalties, 67 Fed. Reg.
45, 240 (July 8, 2002). The resulting license terms and rates were subject to much criticism when
issued. In particular, many smaller internet radio stations objected that the rates, as set by the
Librarian of Congress, would essentially drive them completely out of business. See Loren,
supra note 8, at 696; Evan Hansen, Webcasters Sound Off on Net Radio Fees, CNETNews.com,
Oct. 1, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-960336.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); Amy Harmon, Royalties Proposal Casts Shadow Over
Webcasters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at Cl. To provide webcasters some relief, Congress
enacted the Small Web-Caster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780
(2002) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A §§ 101 & 114) (2002), which set off a further round of
negotiations. More generally, the entire process took substantially longer than anticipated. See
Karen Fessler, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399, 408-10 (2003).
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4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
Although the DPRSRA probably represents the most extensive
example of the regulatory approach, the recent Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)234 provided a slightly new twist to the
approach. Congress enacted the DMCA in an attempt to update copyright
law in light of perceived challenges presented by digital technology. The
DMCA contained many separate provisions, some of which dealt with
liability for intermediaries such as internet service providers (ISPs).235
These provisions of the DMCA exempted ISPs from direct and indirect
liability for certain activities such as system caching and temporary storage
and forwarding. 36 The DMCA also enacted a safe harbor, shielding ISPs
from liability for storing subscriber content, under certain circumstances.237
These provisions generally provided more specificity and guidance to ISPs,
who had been concerned about potentially extensive liability under the
Copyright Act. These provisions are consistent with the regulatory trend in
copyright law, insofar as they supplement judge-made doctrines of third
party liability238 by enacting detailed rules and safe harbors for ISPs and
other internet intermediaries.
More important for our purposes, the DMCA also contained separate
provisions supporting industry attempts to protect copyrighted works
through the use of technology.239 In particular, the DMCA provided a
separate cause of action against acts of circumvention of technologies that
controlled access to copyrighted materials.24 The DMCA contained a
number of very specific statutory exemptions. 41 It also gave the Librarian
of Congress the power to exempt certain classes of works from antiThe DMCA also banned distribution of
circumvention liability. 42
technologies with a primary purpose of facilitating circumvention. Finally,
the DMCA provided a cause of action for tampering with or removing
copyright management information attached to copyrighted works.24 3

234. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 122 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
235. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
236. Id. § 512(a) & (b).
237. Id. § 512(c).
238. See Alfred Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, EnterpriseLiability,and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1872 (2000).
239. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202.
240. Id. § 1201(a).
241. Id. § 1201(d)-(k). See Lewis A. Kaplan, Copyright And The Internet, 22 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 1, 7 (2003) ("I think it fair to say that these exemptions are narrow and difficult to
satisfy").
242. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
243. Id. § 1202.
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Although the DMCA has generated much debate, 244 some aspects of
its approach are not that different from the older property rights approach.
The DMCA can be viewed as creating an additional property entitlement
against circumvention, as a way of providing additional support to the
underlying copyright entitlement. Indeed, some supporters of the DMCA
have argued that, by facilitating enforcement of copyright entitlements, it
may facilitate private ordering and promote even more efficient allocation
of property entitlements. 45 Thus, whether or not one agrees with the
substantive content of the law, its underlying approach does not differ too
dramatically from the property rights model.
In other respects, however, the DMCA represents a departure from the
property rights model. In particular, the DMCA, taking a page from the
AHRA, is more willing to intervene in the technology markets. 46 By
banning certain technologies from public distribution, the DMCA again
affects the market for technology.247 More significantly, the DMCA
departs from the property rights view insofar as it expressly gives the
Librarian of Congress, for the first time, not only power over the terms and
conditions of compulsory licenses, but actual substantive rulemaking
power.248 The DMCA delegates to the Librarian of Congress the power,
after notice and comment, to exempt classes of works from the
anticircumvention provisions entirely.249 In crafting such exemptions, the
Librarian of Congress is directed to consider various statutory factors,
244. See, e.g., LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at 122-54 (sharply criticizing
provisions of the DMCA); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology,
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 819 (2001)
(criticizing the way in which the DMCA has eliminated key limitations on protection of
copyrighted work); cf Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 519
(1999) (sharply criticizing the DMCA for its impact on innovation and technology).
245. See Tom Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management
on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 600 (1998); I. Trotter Hardy, Property
(And Copyright) In Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 219 (1996). But see Yochai
Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2063, 2070 (2000) (criticizing this view); Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 466 (1998) (same); Mark
A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justificationsfor Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
129, 132 (2004) (same).
246. See Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright Statutes That Regulate Technology: A Comparative
Analysis Of The Audio Home Recording Act And The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 75
WASH. L. REV. 611, 631 (2000).
247. On the other hand, the ban on technology may not be all that different, at least from a
regulatory perspective, from the ban that might result from an application of contributory or
vicarious liability. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-27 (9th Cir.
2001). So it is possible to argue that this aspect is not all that different from the property rights
view.
248. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000).
249. Id.
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including the availability of the copyrighted works for various nonprofit,
archival preservation, and educational purposes; the impact of the
anticircumvention provisions on criticism, comment, teaching, news
reporting, and scholarship; the effect of circumvention on the market for or
value of copyrighted works; and any other factors that the Librarian
considers appropriate. °
The Librarian of Congress conducted the first such rulemaking two
years after enactment of the DMCA and, after extensive notice and
comment, exempted four classes of works."' Three years later, the
Librarian again conducted the rulemaking and exempted four such
classes. 2 In each case, the Librarian published notice of the proposed
rulemaking. Many proposed exemptions, and even more comments, were
submitted. The Librarian of Congress also held hearings, at which parties
could testify in support of, or against, various proposed exemptions. And
in each case, the Librarian issued its regulations, along with a response to
these comments articulating the reasons for its regulations.25 3
Thus, the DMCA very expressly adopts a regulatory approach in
vesting the Librarian of Congress with rulemaking authority. Rather than
leaving the development of exemptions to the courts, via an equitable
defense akin to fair use, the DMCA expressly chose to vest such authority
in an administrative body. Moreover, the function of the Librarian of
Congress in this capacity appears to differ relatively little from the way
similar agencies engage in rulemaking in other substantive areas. Thus, the
DMCA is notable for this particular innovation in regulatory approach, and
may signal a willingness on the part of Congress to move even further
toward a regulatory model.
5. Broadcast Flag
The Copyright Office is not the only administrative agency that has
become more involved in setting copyright policy. Recently, the FCC has
played an increasing role in setting copyright policy, through its
250. Id.
25 1. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003).
252. The four categories include: (1) compilations of blocked intemet sites found in internet
filtering software; (2) computer programs protected by physical access control mechanisms,
where access is impaired due to malfunction or obsolescence; (3) computer programs and video
games distributed in formats that have become obsolete; and (4) literary works distributed in
eBook format, where no editions exist that would permit certain types of access by disabled
individuals. 37 C.F.R. § 201 (2003).
253. 68 Fed. Reg. 211, 62011 (Oct. 31, 2003). Many of these materials can be found on the
copyright office web site. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULEMAKING ON ANTICIRCUMVENTION,
at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/index.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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The most recent and
jurisdiction over the broadcast industries.
controversial example of this has been through its broadcast flag
rulemaking. As the television broadcast industry has begun shifting from
analog to digital broadcasts, it has expressed concern about unauthorized
copying and distribution by consumers of high quality digital broadcasts.
To address this concern, the FCC promulgated a rule that would require all
digital television sets to recognize and respect a "broadcast flag," i.e., a
signal embedded in broadcasts that, in conjunction with compliant devices,
would control or restrict copying and distribution of broadcast shows.254
The broadcast flag rulemaking has been subject to sharp criticism on
Yet whatever the substantive merits of the
substantive grounds. 5
broadcast flag, it again represents a rather sharp departure from the
traditional property rights model of copyright law. Indeed, the broadcast
flag goes beyond the DMCA in its regulation of copyright-related
technology, insofar as it mandates the adoption of technologies that would
protect copyrighted content. Moreover, an agency (rather than Congress or
the courts) is involved not only in promulgating the technological
requirement, but in specifying the types of technologies that comply with
the requirement. The broadcast flag rulemaking thus represents an even
more extensive intervention into the structure of the market.
6. Future Proposals
Finally, many recent proposals for further amending or reforming the
Copyright Act have also adopted a more regulatory approach. First, at least
one recent bill proposed by Senator Ernest Hollings would have intervened
even more extensively in technology markets than the DMCA or the
broadcast flag. The Hollings bill, proposed in 2002, would have mandated
that every device capable of playing digital content contain technology to
prevent unauthorized copying. 5 6 Thus, even general purpose digital
devices, such as computers, would have had to implement copy protection
or access control technology. This would have intervened far more
intrusively into the development of the computer and consumer electronics
industries. Those industries successfully banded together with consumers
to defeat the proposed legislation. 7
A number of academics have also advanced very detailed proposals to
significantly revamp copyright law in light of the challenges presented by
254. 68 Fed. Reg. 232, 67604 (Dec. 3, 2003).
255. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 603, 606 (2003) (arguing that such codes hinder technological innovation).
256. S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002).
257. See Stacey Dogan, Code Versus the Common Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
73, 98-100 & n. 106 (2003) (describing in detail the Hollings Bill).
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digital technology. Specifically, these scholars have advanced proposals
for replacing the existing entitlement structure for digital media with a
compulsory license or levy, similar to the levy found in the AHRAY 8 In
each case, the proposals would permit certain consumer copying of digital
content free from copyright liability. However, a levy would be placed on
certain related materials (e.g., computers, media) or activities (e.g.,
downloading, ISP access) to compensate copyright owners. The basic
impetus behind these proposals is a concern that enforcement difficulties
are rendering the existing entitlement structure untenable, and a desire to
take full advantage of the increased dissemination possibilities provided by
digital technology.
These proposals are, in many ways, a logical extension of the
regulatory trend in copyright law over the past several years. The
proposals expressly adopt aspects of prior amendments, such as the existing
compulsory licenses and the levy under the AHRA. They then extend these
features to cover not just a limited slice of the copyright markets, but large
portions of the copyright markets. They thus replace the property rights
approach with a purely regulatory approach. In each of these cases, the
government's involvement in the shape and scope of the copyright markets
would be far more extensive than with an industry-neutral, property rights
model. Indeed, under some of these proposals, a regulatory body would be
involved in setting, not only prices, but the overall size and scope of certain
copyright markets.259
D. Comparative Scope
The regulatory approach to copyright law, as defined in the beginning
of this Part, has thus established itself firmly as an alternative to the older,
industry-neutral, court-administered property rights model. Although many
parts of the 1976 Act still retain, at their core, a property rights model,
other parts of the 1976 Act, along with recent amendments, have adopted
the competing regulatory approach, with its increased detail, greater
industry-specificity, willingness to intervene in market structure (through
258. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 199-258; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction
of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
312-15 (2002); Glynn Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 854-58 (2001); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing,
17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003); Lionel S. Sobel, DRM As An Enabler Of Business Models:
ISPs As Digital Retailers, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 684-87 (2003); Electronic Frontier
Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing, at
http://www.eff.org/share/collective-licwp.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
259. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 195-96.
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imposition of compulsory licenses and express regulation of technology),
and a greater substantive role for the Librarian of Congress.
What this means in practice is that the impact of the copyright laws
now varies significantly depending upon the industry. For example, the
print publishing (books, newspapers, magazines, etc.) and fine arts
(sculpture, painting, etc.) industries remain largely governed by the
property rights model. The rights are set forth rather straightforwardly in
the statute and the market is responsible for organizing production of
creative works in light of the entitlement structure. Other industries, such
as the software industry, are somewhat more affected by the regulatory
turn, but still operate largely under the basic property entitlement.
By contrast, other industries are subject to far greater regulatory
oversight. Thus, the music industry is subject to a complex overlay of
multiple regulatory regimes. 6 ° The exclusive rights are distributed in a
non-uniform manner among industry participants (e.g., sound recordings
versus musical works). Certain aspects of the industry are subject to
relatively straightforward compulsory licenses (e.g., cover and jukebox
licenses). Other aspects of the industry are subject to extremely complex
statutory licenses (e.g., digital performances of sound recordings). In each
of these cases, either Congress or the Librarian of Congress is involved in
setting the rates and terms of various licenses. Still other aspects of the
industry are subject to regulation in the technology adopted (e.g., AHRA,
DMCA).
Although it is probably too early to conclude that the regulatory
approach has supplanted the property rights approach, the above analysis
indicates that the regulatory approach is no longer a limited exception to
the rule. 6' Instead, it is a rather firmly established alternative to the
property rights model. Moreover, recent copyright legislation has evinced
a pronounced willingness to adopt the regulatory approach. Thus, the clear
trend has been to move toward a regulatory model for copyright.
Although many commentators have recognized the increased size and
complexity of the Copyright Act,262 the nature and full scope of the change
have not been fully appreciated, at least until recently. Much of the
existing literature remains focused on the portions of the Act that are still
260. See Loren, supra note 8, at 699 (describing the complex regulatory framework governing
copyrights in music and sound recordings); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1320 (detailing accelerating
shift toward complex copyright law); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 118, 119, 122 (2000)
(providing special provisions governing television and cable industries).
261. See Leval, supra note 81, at 1061 ("The relationship we have observed between the
legislature and the courts in fashioning the copyright is one that is no longer in fashion."); Menell,
supra note 7, at 197 ("Copyright law has entered a new phase in which the government will play
a more central and ongoing role in the implementation of copyright protection.").
262. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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governed by the property rights model.263 Comparatively little literature is
devoted to those portions that are governed by the regulatory model.
Similarly, most copyright and intellectual property law casebooks still
emphasize the property rights regime, and treat the more regulatory
portions of the Act, if at all, as exceptions to or limited departures from the
property rights model. This is true, despite the fact that copyright practice
has increasingly forced practitioners to deal with these more regulatory
aspects of the Act.
In part, the failure to fully appreciate this change may be because the
In part, there may also be an
shift has been relatively recent.
understandable reluctance to grapple with the portions of the copyright act
that are seen as overly complex, narrow in scope, arcane, and painfully
(and in some cases absurdly) detailed. The property rights model, with its
judicial opinions and engagement with broad, fundamental copyright
principles is far more intellectually and aesthetically satisfying. Reading
Feist v. Rural Telephone or Sony v. Universal is far more enjoyable than
reading the intricate provisions of the DPRSRA. Yet the future shape of
the Copyright Act will, I believe, resemble the DPRSRA more than Feist.
In many ways, then, this Article is an attempt to force us to recognize that
these portions are no longer the exceptions but a fundamental and
important part of the Act.
Recognition of this change leads to a more critical evaluation of its
costs and benefits and the potential implications for the various legal
institutions that currently administer our copyright laws. Copyright law is
experiencing, albeit at a much later date, the same response to complexity
that has characterized other areas of federal law."M The dramatic rise of the
federal administrative state during the first half of this century reflected a
recognition of the limits of statutory and common law lawmaking in the
face of the complexities of modem society. Accordingly, in many other
areas of federal law, Congress recognized the practical need to delegate
authority to administrative agencies as a way of injecting both expertise
and flexibility into the regulatory process. This same recognition has
arrived later in the context of copyright law, due to the relatively recent
dramatic changes facing the copyright industries.

263. See Carrier, supra note 14 (forthcoming); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese,
Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN L. REV. 1345,
1351-53 (2004); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 41113 (2002); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,471-74
(2004).
264. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

TREATISE § 1.4 (3d ed. 1994); Menell, supra note 197, at 2649 (comparing to environmental law
shift).
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III. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

This Part undertakes a critical assessment of the shift from a property
rights approach to a more regulatory approach. It begins by offering a
number of possible explanations for the shift. It next discusses a number of
benefits of the current regulatory approach, in particular the ability to solve
perceived market failures and tailor rights and responsibilities in a far more
detailed fashion. It then focuses on some of the costs of the shift to a more
regulatory approach. In particular, it focuses on the comparative lack of
transparency and the related increased incentive for rent-seeking on the part
of the regulated industries. It also focuses on the current system's
underutilization of empirical data and expertise in setting copyright policy.
These findings form the basis of the recommendations in the following
265
Part.
A.

Why the Shift?

What explains the shift in copyright law from a property rights
approach to a more regulatory approach? Although this Article does not
purport to set forth the definitive reason, it suggests a couple of
possibilities. First, some of the increased complexity of the copyright code
can probably be attributed to the increased complexity of the subject
matter. The initial Copyright Act regulated an extremely limited set of
works, namely books, charts, and maps. Thus, a simple entitlement was
generally sufficient to deal with the relatively simple markets involved. By
contrast, today's Copyright Act must regulate the vast subject matter
encompassed by modem copyright law, including such diverse types of
works as books, newspapers, magazines, fine art, movies, recorded music,
and computer software.266 In addition, many of these industries have been
subject to significant challenges as a result of changing technologies. Thus
one would reasonably expect the copyright entitlement to become more
complex as the subject matter of regulation becomes more complex.267
Second, and relatedly, some of the increased complexity may also be
attributable to the increased importance and value of these markets. Where
265. It is worth noting expressly here at the outset that, in assessing the potential advantages
and disadvantages of a more regulatory approach, this Article is concerned, not directly with
substantive copyright policy (for example, whether protection should be "high" or "low" in a
particular area), but with the ability of legislation or regulation to effectively reflect and
implement such policy. This requires an assessment of the comparative effectiveness of various
regulatory techniques and legal institutions in effectuating such policies. See NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 32 (1994).

266. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
267. See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 6, at 2200-01 (positing this as a possible
explanation).
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certain property entitlements are of comparatively low value, it may not be
cost effective to articulate the scope of such entitlements in a detailed
fashion. However, as property entitlements become more valuable, it
becomes more worthwhile for the law to define the entitlements in a more
particularized fashion, whether through legislation or litigation.268 The
incentive to fine-tune the law increases. By any measure, the copyright
industries have become economically far more significant than they were at
the turn of the century. Thus, we might expect the corresponding law to
articulate these copyright entitlements in a far more detailed manner.
Third, the increasing regulatory turn in copyright law may reflect an
increasing desire to cure perceived market failures that might result from a
pure property rights approach. Some of the complex compulsory license
schemes can be understood as motivated by this concern. With each of the
compulsory licenses, the policy question is how this departure from the
market baseline (and the attendant, non-trivial administrative costs) can be
justified. The argument for the compulsory license is that the market
would otherwise fail.269 For example, in the case of cable re-transmissions,
the argument might be that transactions costs, the possibility of holdouts,
and other strategic behavior by copyright owners might make it impossible
for cable companies to effectively obtain licenses for all of the works that
they wish to retransmit.2 0 Or, alternatively, that there might be certain
public values in access to these materials that would otherwise not be met.
Thus, the Act substitutes a compulsory license. Similarly, with the AHRA
or many of the new levy proposals, the claim may be that the costs of
enforcement with a property rights model are simply too high, and that the
model must therefore be replaced by an alternative structure. This
alternative structure is inherently more regulatory than a basic, property
rights structure. Thus, the increased use of a regulatory format may well
indicate both an increased recognition of market failures and a growing
desire to cure them.
Fourth, the increasing regulatory nature of copyright law may result in
part from the pragmatic need for political compromise on the part of
entrenched interests.27 1 The 1976 revision of the Copyright Act took more
than twenty years, in part due to the need to balance the interests of many
competing industries and groups. Given the complexity of the subject
matter, Congress expressly invited industry groups to participate in the
268. See Carroll, supra note 103, at 40-41; Demsetz, supra note 29, at 350.
269. But see Merges, supra note 86, at 1298 (arguing that private collective rights
organizations can effectively address the transactions cost problem).
270. See supra Part fl.B.3.
271. See Menell, supra note 7, at 197 (suggesting increased delegation results from need to
effect political compromise between content industry, technology, and consumers).
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drafting of specific provisions of the 1976 Act.272 This had the advantage
of both injecting much needed expertise into the policy discussion and
facilitating the kind of political compromise necessary to pass the Act. z73
Some of the resulting statutory provisions, however, resembled the kind of
detailed deal-making engaged in by private parties.274
Subsequent
amendments also resulted from the need to balance the interests of
275
competing groups.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the increasing complexity of
copyright law may result from rent-seeking on the part of the regulated
industries. The increased value and importance of the copyright markets
make copyright legislation a prime source for rent-seeking by organized
interests, such as existing copyright holders. Moreover, competing
interests such as consumers or nascent industries are more diffusely
organized and under-represented. 276 The predictable result, given this
imbalance, is rent-seeking by organized interests.277 Jessica Litman has
written extensively about the way that the copyright industries were
involved heavily in the drafting of the 1976 revision to the Act, and how
consumers and future industries were not represented. 278 True, rent-seeking
does not inevitably lead to more legislative complexity. 279 However, as
copyright law becomes more complex, it becomes less understandable to
general policymakers and the public at large, 280 and rent-seeking becomes
281
more difficult to detect.
It is hard to say definitively which of these factors is primarily
responsible for the shift to a more regulatory copyright law. Clearly, the
desire to cure perceived market failures can be used to justify some of the
272. See Litman, supra note 68, at 862.
273. See Merges, New Institutional Economics, supra note 6, at 1875-76; Merges, One
Hundred Years, supra note 6, at 2198; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1685-86 (1975).
274. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (outlining extensive limitations on secondary
transmissions).
275. See, e.g., id. § I 14(d)-(f) (setting forth the scope and limitations of the exclusive rights
in transmissions and re-transmissions of sound recordings).
276. See Litman, supra note 68, at 883-84.
277. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998)) (extending the copyright term to life plus
seventy years); Liu, supra note 263 passim (arguing that courts should adjust the scope of
copyright protection to account for the passage of time).
278. See Litman, supra note 68, at 881.
279. For an example of a relatively simple statute that resulted largely from rent-seeking, see
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
280. See Nimmer, supra note 4, at 246-48 (positing public choice explanation for DPRSRA);
Schuck, supra note 98, at 39-40.
281. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1637; Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1317 (describing
recent "stealth amendments" to copyright act); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts And Policy: A MultiInstitutionalApproach To PatentSystem Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1128 (2003).
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departures from the property rights baseline. For example, compulsory
licenses are often justified as necessary to address potential market failures
due to transactions costs or holdouts. This is perhaps most visible in the
recent proposals to move toward some kind of compulsory license of
digital content.282 Thus, to some extent, the regulatory turn might reflect
the need for more interventionist
techniques in achieving a more finely283
tuned copyright balance.
At the same time, the market failure explanation does not neatly fit the
actual history of these more complex provisions. Even if the cable,
satellite, and digital music compulsory licenses can be explained as curing
potential market failures, the actual history of those provisions, as Tim Wu
has effectively demonstrated, reveals that they were very much the product
of industry lobbying and compromise rather than an impartial search for
ways to effectively cure market failure.2 4 In fact, many of the specific
provisions of these enactments, as implemented, bear little or no relevance
to any underlying market failure, and can only be explained through the
dynamic of competing interest groups.285 In addition, the market failure
rationale does not adequately explain the passage or implementation of the
AHRA, DPRSRA or the DMCA, where the case for, and evidence of,
market failure was far weaker.
Thus, while the regulatory turn in copyright law is likely the product
of many different factors, the explanations based on industry compromise
and rent-seeking appear to explain much of this regulatory turn. If this is
correct, it will have implications on the proposed responses in the
following Part of this Article. In particular, this history may shed light on
the practical feasibility of returning to a property rights model, even if such
a model offers concrete benefits. This history may also have implications
on how a regulatory model might best be structured to minimize the
opportunities for future rent-seeking. Before engaging in these more
practical discussions, however, it is worth considering, at a more general
level, the potential advantages and disadvantages of a regulatory approach
versus a property rights approach. That is, even if the current system is
largely the product of industry compromise and rent-seeking, we should
assess the merits of the system before suggesting any departures or
reforms.
282. See sources cited supra note 258.
283. See Ghosh, supra note 2, at 482 ("[T]he family resemblance between intellectual
property law and tax law need not be bemoaned ....
The resemblance is to be expected and
speaks proudly of the instrumental role of intellectual property law.").
284. Tim Wu has persuasively argued that enactment of these compulsory licenses reflected a
political compromise driven by a desire on the part of incumbent disseminators to protect their
markets from challengers. Wu, supra note 10 (forthcoming).
285. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1282.
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Advantages

Whatever the reasons for the change in copyright law, the shift to a
more regulatory approach offers a number of potential advantages in the
pursuit and implementation of effective copyright policy. First, it has
permitted greater tailoring of the copyright code to the specifics of

particular industries. One criticism of the industry-neutral property-based
approach has been that it neglects important differences in the copyright
markets. For example, the market for computer software is very different
from the market for fine art photography, which, in turn, is very different
from the market for recorded music.286 Although the courts have, in
application of the law, adapted copyright law doctrines to take some

account of these differences," 7 there is a practical limit on the extent to
which this is possible. For example, the long term of copyright protection

makes little economic sense in the software context, yet courts can do little
about this. 88 Industry-specific enactments thus hold out the potential for
better tailoring of the Act in order to further the purposes of the Copyright
Act. Michael Carroll has recently argued that Congress should, under some

circumstances, engage in more such tailoring.289
Second, the regulatory approach has, in many instances, provided

greater clarity to the regulated parties. The detailed statutory exemptions
from liability,29 ° for example, provide far more guidance to parties about
what they can and cannot do with copyrighted works. Although the fair

use defense has played a significant role in setting the copyright balance, it
is notoriously fuzzy in application. 9' Outcomes in fair use cases are
difficult to predict with any certainty. The detailed exemptions thus
provide clear guidance. 92 Similarly, the compulsory license provisions,
286. See Crews, supra note 9, at 565.
287. See generally Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding a
program's menu structure an unprotectible method of operation); Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai,
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (creating the abstraction-filtration-comparison test for infringement);
Sega Enterp. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (crafting a limited reverse
engineering privilege); Dogan & Liu, supra note 196 (forthcoming).
288. Lawrence Lessig, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN AN
INTERCONNECTED WORLD 252 (2001) ("The current [term of] protection for software ...is a
parody of the Constitution's requirement that copyright be for "limited times .... The term for
copyright for software is effectively unlimited"); Samuelson et al., supra note 197, at 2346-47
(making a similar point). But see Liu, supra note 263 passim (proposing that courts adjust the
scope of copyright protection to account for the passage of time).
289. See Carroll, supra note 103, at 20-60.
290. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-122 (2000).
291. Id. § 107. See also Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939)
(calling fair use "the most troublesome [issue] in the whole law of copyright").
292. The legislative history of the 1976 Act also includes detailed provisions, negotiated by
the relevant parties, setting forth what constitutes fair use in the context of classroom teaching.
H.R.REP. No. 94-1476, at 69 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5683. These provisions
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although extremely complex, provide a very detailed roadmap, which the
regulated industries can follow with some certainty. All else being equal,
greater clarity encourages legitimate behavior and reduces disputes and
293
costs of enforcement.
Third, despite the potential for capture, the regulatory approach may
have cured market failures in particular industries. The possible benefit has
already been discussed in the previous Section.294 The merits of this
argument have been extensively debated elsewhere, 295 and this is not the
place to revisit that debate, other than simply to note that this is another
potential benefit of the regulatory approach.
Fourth and finally, the more detailed regulatory approach may have
made it practically easier for changes to be made in the law. As mentioned
above, the 1976 revision of the Act took more than twenty years, largely
because of the wide array of interests implicated by the revision. In order
to secure passage of the Act, Congress sought the direct involvement of the
regulated industries in the drafting and negotiating of various parts of the
statute.296 Many of the detailed provisions in the Act were perceived as
necessary to secure agreement on the Act. Thus, although this contributed
to the complexity of the Act, in some sense the complexity was necessary if
there was to be a revision in the first place.297 Thus, as a pragmatic matter,
one benefit of the regulatory approach is that it may facilitate the type of
political compromise necessary to make changes to the law. Moreover, as
the prospect of another wholesale revision of the Copyright Act grows
dimmer, this type of complex political compromise may be the only way to
effect change in the future.
C.

Disadvantages
1. General Disadvantages

Although there are advantages to the regulatory approach, there are
also a number of disadvantages. Some of these are general disadvantages
associated with the approach as a whole, while others are specific to the
were an attempt to provide more clarity in the context of fair use.
293. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 125; MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31-32 (2d ed. 1989).
294. See supra Part II.B.3.
295. See sources cited supra note 173.
296. See Litman, supra note 68, at 881 (critiquing the absence of the public in these
discussions); Merges, New Institutional Economics, supra note 6, at 2201; Thomas P. Olson, The
Iron Law of Consensus: CongressionalResponses to ProposedCopyright Reform Since the 1909
Act, J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 109, 116-17 (1989).
297. See Oman, supra note 142, at 39 (describing Congress's preference for compromise and
how compulsory licenses satisfy that preference).
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way it has been implemented. The first and most obvious disadvantage is
complexity. The regulatory approach, as implemented in the copyright
context, has made copyright law far more complex. For example, the
provisions of the DPRSRA are extremely complicated.29 8 Although
detailed provisions may be clearer and easier to follow in one sense (by
reducing legal ambiguity), they may at the same time be more difficult to
understand, as industry participants must wade through many detailed (and
sometimes contradictory) statutory provisions to find answers. 99 By
contrast, a simpler property entitlement is easier to understand, making it
easier for parties to avoid infringement and to enter into market
transactions. 00
Another potential cost of complexity is that it may make the
underlying policy goals of copyright less transparent.0 1 Under a simpler,
judicially administered entitlement structure, the policies underlying
copyright law are front and center, as courts are required to articulate the
reasons for their decisions and are forced to grapple with these underlying
policies in applying the broad terms of the statute to particular cases.
Whether the basis for protection is the need to preserve incentives or to
reward authors for their labor, these rationales are expressed and articulated
by the courts as they apply the statute to specific cases. Under the
regulatory approach, however, it sometimes becomes more difficult to
detect the underlying policies in the thicket of complex provisions. Indeed,
in some cases, there may be no underlying policy at all, and the provision
may only be explainable as the result of interest group bargaining.3 2 Thus,
copyright law may become less visibly tethered to underlying policy goals.
Courts may also find it easier to defer to Congress or interpret statutory
terms literally in the absence of strong signals about the underlying
policies.3 3 Judge Pierre Leval, for example, has lamented the diminished
role of the courts in developing copyright policy." °
298. See supra Part II.C.3.
299. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1336-39 (describing process of giving advice on the
DPRSRA).
300. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 125; POLINSKY, supra note 293, at 15-19
Merges, supra note 86, at 1306; Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 577, 605-08 (1988). But see Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L.
REv. 121, 163-78 (1999) (suggesting benefits derived from maintaining ambiguous standards).
301. See Nimmer, supra note 1,at 1271-73, 1315.
302. For example, the lack of a public performance right for sound recordings finds little if
any support in copyright policy, and can only be explained as the result of raw interest group
pressure. See Loren, supra note 8, at 683-85.
303. Compare the approaches adopted by the court in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d
1510, 1517-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting fair use broadly in light of policies) with the
approach in Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-49 (2d Cir. 2001) (interpreting
DMCA exemptions very narrowly).
304. See Leval, supra note 81, at 1061 (stating that under the new approach, "[i]nterpretation
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Relatedly, the regulatory approach is subject to more interest group
pressure. By vesting more substantive authority in the legislature and in
administrative agencies, the regulatory approach makes it easier for interest
groups to seek favorable treatment. The added complexity and lack of
conceptual coherence further increase the incentive and opportunities for
rent-seeking by affected industries. Where the statute is relatively simple,
departures from a property-based structure and its underlying principles are
more visible. So, for example, when the player piano industry was subject
to a compulsory license, this departure from the property rights model was
quite clear.3" 5 In addition, with a simpler entitlement, further details and
articulation are provided by the courts, which are relatively more immune
from interest group pressure.3" 6 By contrast, where a statute is far more
complex and encumbered by special provisions, it is easier for the
regulated parties to seek favorable treatment in the complexities of the
code.30 7 Thus, it may be more difficult to detect and oppose these examples
of favorable treatment.30 8
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, the regulatory approach
requires more detailed knowledge about markets and industry structures,
knowledge that Congress may lack. One of the virtues of a simpler
property rights approach is that, assuming that transactions costs do not get
in the way, it permits parties to bargain flexibly in response to market
conditions. A simple property entitlement thus may do a better job of
efficiently allocating resources in response to changing technology and
market conditions, particularly if the entitlement is difficult to value 3" and
where future technology is difficult to predict. By contrast, neither
Congress nor the courts are well equipped to place specific values on
must hew as closely as possible to a statute's most literal terms, no matter how senseless such a
reading may be"); see also Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The
Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 209 (1984) (noting his own tendency to
interpret complex and specific statutes more literally).
305. See Rai, supra note 281, at 1130 (suggesting that detailed statutory departures from
baseline property rights model reflect rent-seeking, and stating that "[e]ven though Congress has'
generally avoided fleshing out the open-ended language of the patent statute, those amendments
that have been made appear to reflect wealth transfers to particular industries.").
306. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1637; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 911-15 (1987).
307. See Burk & Lemiley, supra note 2, at 1637-39; Menell, supra note 7, at 195-97; see also
Nimmer, supra note 1,at 1317 (describing the failed attempt to surreptitiously include sound
recordings as works capable of being works made for hire).
308. This may explain the accelerating trend in the complexity of the act. See Menell, supra
note 7, at 195-97 (positing this as an explanation).
309. Where a particular entitlement is difficult to value, enforcing it via a property rule (as
opposed to a liability rule) forces the parties in the market to bargain. Because the parties can
more accurately value entitlements such as intellectual property rights, the prices they reach in the
market will better reflect the value of these entitlements. See COTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at
119-28; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 1092, 1105-06.
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intangible intellectual property rights. For example, Congress may be ill
equipped to specify, with any certainty, how much a given compulsory
license should be worth or what the ideal terms of such a compulsory
license should be. More generally, a simple property rights structure relies
upon the market to generate information about prices, technologies, and
market structures. Thus, where bargaining is relatively costless, a property
entitlement may do a better job of organizing the production of creative
works in an efficient manner.
2. Disadvantages as Currently (Partially) Implemented
In addition to the general problems above, there have been problems
with the implementation of the regulatory approach in the specific context
of copyright law. In other areas of federal law involving complex statutes,
Congress often gives an administrative agency the authority to administer
the federal statute. Under familiar administrative law theory, delegation of
such authority to an agency takes advantage of the agency's greater
expertise and flexibility, as compared to Congress. 3 Thus agencies often
play a significant role in areas involving complex federal enactments,
whether through rulemaking, enforcement, or adjudication.
Unlike these other areas, agency involvement-specifically the
Librarian of Congress's involvement-in administering the Copyright Act,
though increasing, has historically been more limited and has not kept pace
with the complexity of the Copyright Act. As described above, the
Copyright Office is an arm of the Library of Congress. It thus sits under
Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article II, like the executive
branch agencies.
Moreover, its historical role has been limited to
registering copyrights and looking after primarily ministerial tasks
associated with registration.312 It was never intended to serve all of the
functions of a traditional executive branch agency. True,.in recent years,
Congress has begun to give it more power-some ratemaking,
adjudicatory, and limited rulemaking authority. And the Copyright Office
has certainly played an important role in advising Congress on issues of
copyright policy more generally. However, the Copyright Office's role is
comparatively more limited than the role of other agencies. This reflects
the fact that we are still in the process of making the transition from a

310. See, e.g., DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 264, at 7-14 (discussing the advantages of
agencies).
311. Note, however, that the Librarian is appointed by the President, subject to confirmation
by the Senate. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1978). For a more extensive
discussion of the constitutional implications of the Copyright Office's role, see infra note 397.
312. See supra Part I.B.
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property rights regime to a regulatory regime." 3
Because of the lack of strong agency involvement, the implementation
of the regulatory approach in the context of copyright suffers from
additional flaws and fails to take full advantage of the potential benefits of
a fully regulatory approach. First, copyright law does not currently take
full advantage of the potential expertise offered by an administrative
agency. The Copyright Office's role, though increasing, is still limited.
The vast bulk of its rulemaking authority relates to non-substantive issues
like registration. And although it reports to Congress on issues of policy,
these reports are purely advisory.3 14 Thus, its ability to directly apply its
expertise is limited. Moreover, the Copyright Office does not have as
much expertise on this front as it potentially could. Most of the staff of the
Office remains concerned with the ministerial tasks with which the Office
is charged.315 The Office thus lacks the economic and technological
expertise that would make it an even more effective source for informed
copyright policy. One side effect of this lack of expertise is a reliance upon
the regulated industries for information about copyright markets and
technology.
Second, and even more problematically, regulatory copyright, as
currently implemented, lacks sufficient flexibility. Although the Act has
increased in complexity and detail, most of these provisions have largely
been hardwired into the copyright statute. Thus, these provisions are
potentially much more difficult to alter. This is particularly problematic in
light of the dynamic nature of current copyright markets, faced as they are
with dramatic technological change.316 Anchoring detailed provisions in a
statute risks making these provisions inapplicable. One concrete example
is the AHRA, in which Congress assumed that most personal copying of
recorded music would be done by dedicated digital audio tape decks.317
This assumption turned out to be mistaken, as most consumers turned to
multi-purpose computer equipment. However, because the AHRA was
313. Indeed, the lack of a strong central regulatory agency has led to a regulatory vacuum,
which other agencies are seeking to fill. For example, the FCC has recently begun to play an
increasing role in copyright policy with its broadcast flag rulemaking. See supra Part H.C.5.
314. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(b)(l) (2000).
315. See Copyright Office Org. Chart, at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/c-71 l.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
316. See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 6, at 2191-2206; Rai, supra note 281, at
1128 (making similar point about patent law and innovation).
317. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the Digital Age: Malum In Se and Malum
Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000); Niels Schaumann, Copyright
Infringement And Peer-To-Peer Technology, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2002);
Stephanie Skasko Rosenberg, Note, Anticipating Technology: A Statute Bytes The Dust In
Recording Industry Ass'n Of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 45 VILL. L. REV.
483 (2000).
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based on the earlier assumption, it was not written to apply to multipurpose computer equipment (e.g., computers or CD burners), 18 and as a
result, the statute is largely irrelevant today. The more recent DPRSRA
may be another example of this. Indeed, the DPRSRA has already been
amended twice by Congress to address failings in the original enactment.3 19
In many ways, the current situation represents the worst of both
worlds. In its most recent enactments, Congress has passed extremely
detailed, highly specific provisions without the benefit of the flexibility and
expertise that could be provided by an administrative agency. And
although Congress is at least in theory more representative and responsive
to the public than an administrative agency, its dependence upon regulated
industries for expertise and data has made it less responsive to the public at
large. Copyright law is caught awkwardly halfway between a judicially
administered property rights regime and an agency administered regulatory
regime.
IV.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

This Part of the Article begins to suggest some directions for reform,
in light of the analysis above. First, the strengths and weaknesses analyzed
above suggest guidelines for when a regulatory approach might, at least in
theory, be preferable to a property rights based approach and vice versa.
Applied specifically to existing copyright law, this suggests that the
regulatory approach might be appropriate for the cable and satellite
industries, but not appropriate for areas involving digital technology. In the
latter instance, copyright law would ideally return to a more property rights
based approach. Such an approach would give more flexibility for market
actors and courts to adapt to changing technologies and market conditions.
Given the political pressures that have driven the departure from the
property-based approach, it may be difficult to return to a simpler form of
regulation. However, some specific reforms in a number of areas would do
much to improve the function of copyright law. At the very least, Congress
should resist extending this approach to new areas of digital copyright.
This conclusion leads to the second set of proposals. If much of
existing copyright law will remain under the regulatory approach, then
there are a number of ways to improve this approach.
Once we
318. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(3), (4)(B)(ii), (5)(B)(ii); A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d
1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999).
319. Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780 (codified
at 17 U.S.C.A. § 114 (2003)); Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Title IV, Pub. L. No.
105-304, §§ 401-407, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887-2905 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.); see also Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1336-39 (noting the amendments).
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acknowledge that copyright has become more regulatory and that this
aspect of copyright law is here to stay, then it behooves us to think more
carefully about how to properly administer a complex statutory framework.
In particular, more attention needs to be paid to the institutional structure
administering the copyright laws. Taking the regulatory approach seriously
suggests, among other things: granting the Copyright Office or some other
agency greater rulemaking authority in order to flexibly adapt copyright
law to changing circumstances; giving the Copyright Office sufficient
resources and expertise to undertake this task; and ensuring that the process
is open to participation from a wide range of interests.
A.

When to Deploy

The analysis in the previous Part of the Article suggests some tentative
guidelines about when a regulatory approach might be preferred over a
property rights approach. For example, where there is good data for a
particular industry, where the main participants in that industry are easily
identifiable and well-represented, and where a particular market failure is
well-defined, a regulatory approach may have significant advantages. It
would provide greater guidance and specificity to the regulated industries.
The rules would be based on some industry experience and more concrete
data. The risks of being locked into a suboptimal regime would be
reduced. Furthermore, most of the industry participants would be relatively
well-established and able to represent themselves in the political process.
Under these conditions, the regulatory approach would permit a more
finely tuned copyright balance of access and incentives to create and reflect
more accurately the full range of interests.
By contrast, where there is significant doubt over both technology
and/or the future structure of the market, where there are new entrants, and
where the case for market failure is less clear, a property-based model may
be preferable.32 ° In such cases, there will be inadequate information about
the technology and/or market upon which to base highly detailed
legislation. As a result, the risk of locking into a poor regulatory
framework will be greater. Moreover, the danger exists that existing
market actors may act in ways that harm future potential market
participants, who are not yet identified and do not yet have seats at the
table. In such cases, it may be preferable to set a simple entitlement and
wait for better information before intervening more significantly into the
structure of the market.3 2'
320. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standardsfor Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275,
1307-08, 1322-28 (2002) (arguing for greater use of flexible standards).
321. See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 6, at 2200-06. But see Menell, supra note

2004]

REGULATORY COPYRIGHT

Applying these guidelines to specific portions of the Copyright Act, it
seems that some of the detailed, industry-specific statutory exemptions in
the act may be relatively unproblematic.3 2 Although somewhat complex,
the exemptions respond to concrete situations in specific industries, and
provide relatively detailed guidelines about what activities do not constitute
infringement. They are based on existing practices, rather than future and
unanticipated events. They intervene far less deeply into the structure of
the markets, insofar as they merely exempt specific activities from liability
(rather than trying to regulate prices or technologies in the market). Thus,
whether one agrees substantively with the specific content of these
provisions, as a matter of regulatory technique, they appear relatively
unproblematic, and may in fact offer significant benefits in the form of
clarity and certainty to the affected industries. Moreover, they do not
preclude flexibility, insofar as courts remain free to craft additional
exceptions through the fair use doctrine.
Applying the above analysis more generally to specific copyright
industries suggests that a regulatory framework might also be quite
appropriate, or at least less damaging, for the cable and satellite industries.
In these cases, the theoretical case for market failure was relatively clear.323
Thus regulation could be targeted specifically to addressing the market
failure. In addition, there had already been a history of litigation between
the two industries. Legislation could thus be enacted in response to an
existing legal baseline. And although both the cable and satellite broadcast
industries were relatively new at the time of the legislation, they were large
and reasonably well-represented in Congress. Accordingly, less risk
existed that legislation might systematically disregard the interests of
certain market actors.324 Finally, both industries had already been subject
to extensive regulation under general communications law. Accordingly,
the cost of complexity of a regulatory structure was not as burdensome.325
197, at 2651-54 (noting the risk that, if Congress waits until there is more information, interests
may become entrenched making it more difficult to make changes).
322. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (providing a limited exemption for libraries); id. § 109 (exempting sales
of legitimate copies); id. § 117 (providing a limited exemption for copies of computer programs);
id. § 120 (exempting photographs of architectural works); id. § 121 (exempting copies of literary
works for the blind).
323. See supra Part H.B.2. But see Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bargaining in the Shadow Of
Copyright Law After Tasini, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 605, 637 (2003) (arguing that cable and
satellite "compulsory licenses cannot be explained simply as transaction cost savings devices;
they were all intended at least in part to regulate rates of remuneration").
324. Tim Wu has argued that these provisions of the Copyright Act reflect a pattern of
legislative settlement between the interests of incumbent and challenger disseminators of
copyrighted content. See Wu, supra note 10 (forthcoming).
325. But see Congressional Hearings Review Copyright Office Report On Broadcast
Licensing, 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 23, 23-24 (1997) (noting testimony of the Register of
Copyrights suggesting that private negotiation would be better).
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Conversely, the guidelines suggest that a regulatory approach is quite
ill suited to issues involving digital copyright.3" 6 Here, the case for market
failure is not at all clear.327 Much debate persists over whether the existing
property rights structure can accommodate new technology. Will existing
legal and technological remedies be sufficient to limit unauthorized
copying to a degree sufficient to compensate the music industry? Or will
digital copying and distribution technologies so undermine the industry that
we need a new approach? Thus far, the empirical evidence is mixed. As a
result, we do not currently have enough information even to establish a
clear need for intervention.
Furthermore, both the technology and market structure are too ill
defined and still too much in flux. No one quite knows how the industry
will shake out in response to the dramatic changes in computer and
network technology.
For example, will digital music be delivered
primarily through online sale of copies, internet radio, on demand
streaming, or some other as yet unknown method? Participants in the
market, both large and small, are still entering and exiting. No good data
exists, and Congress is not equipped with the requisite expertise (whether
technological or economic) to make informed decisions on this front.
Enacting detailed legislation at this point risks locking the law into a
structure that may ultimately be undesirable. As already noted above, the
AHRA was a clear example of this.328
The recent ratemaking proceeding under the DPRSRA concretely
illustrates the types of difficulties listed above.329 As an initial matter, it is
unclear whether detailed legislation was even necessary.330 As others have

argued, the Act is not so much directed at curing any market failure as in
controlling the terms under which new entrants enter the market.331
Furthermore, the market is so new and dynamic that we lack any sound
326. See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 6, at 2233-40; Lee, supra note 320, at
1305-11.
327. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 8, at 679-702 (arguing that no good policy reason exists for
the way in which music copyrights are currently divided up).
328. See supra Part l.C.2; see also 17 U.S.C. § 902 (2000) (providing sui generis protection

for semiconductor works).
329. See Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7-8 (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights)
(detailing concerns with the DPRSRA).
330. See Loren, supra note 8, at 687-91; Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the
Three "Golden Oldies": Property Rights, Contracts, and Markets, 508 POL'Y ANALYSIS, Jan.
15, 2004, 1, 10-12 (arguing that private collective rights organizations could have satisfied
licensing concerns); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1375-76. Cf Ginsburg, supra note 218, at 1630
(suggesting congressional desire to "split the difference" tinder some circumstances, when faced
with new technology and new markets).
331. See Wu, supra note 10 (forthcoming).
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empirical basis for regulating. To take just one example, the DPRSRA, as
subsequently modified by Title IV of the DMCA and the Small Webcaster
Settlement Act, charges the Librarian of Congress with the task of setting
the compulsory license rate for certain internet webcasts of copyrighted
sound recordings in the absence of privately negotiated agreement.332 The
statute required the CARP to set the rate to closely mimic what the market
would have set it at, in the absence of the compulsory license.333 Because
the webcasting industry was so new, however, relatively little actual data
existed to help the CARP make this determination.334 The result was a
lengthy and extremely costly proceeding.335
Similarly, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA exhibited
significant misunderstandings about the nature of the technology being
regulated.336 In particular, Congress enacted a ban on acts of circumvention
and on the distribution of certain anti-circumvention technologies, at a time
when such technologies had yet to be fully developed or marketed.337
Accordingly, the precise applicability of some of the statutory terms to
actual technologies is not at all clear.338 Commentators have documented
other ways in which the DMCA has resulted in unintended
consequences.339 Plaintiffs, moreover, have sought to extend the reach of
the DMCA far beyond what Congress could plausibly have intended, to
apply to such diverse products as garage door openers34 ° and toner
cartridges.34'
332. 17 U.S.C.A § 114(f)(l)(A) (2004).
333. Id. § l14(f)(2)(B).
334. Fessler, supra note 233, at 409.
335. See Joseph Magri, New Media-New Rules: The Digital Performance Right and
Streaming Media over the Internet, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 55, 60 (2003) (detailing the
history of the compulsory license). And in the end, the CARP based the rate on a single
negotiated license between the RIAA and Yahoo.com; see, for example, Fessler, supra note 233,
at 411-12; Loren, supra note 8, at 696-97, 701.
336. See Lee, supra note 320, at 1363-65; Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of
Scientific Research, 18 BERK. TECH. L.J. 501, 532-33 (2003); R. Anthony Reese, Will Merging
Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircumvention Law?, 18
BERK. TECH. L.J. 619, 642-52 (2003).
337. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1343 ("The DMCA is unique by regulating in 1998
activities that not only had no existence then but which still continue to have no reality today.").
338. See Reese, supra note 336, at 630-31.
339. See Fred von Lohmann, Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under the DMCA
passim (2003), at http://www/eff/orglP/DMCA/unintended-Consequences.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2004) (arguing that § 1201 of the DMCA chills free expression and jeopardizes fair use) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1367 ("The sad moral is that
ultracomplicated statutory schemes fail to serve the interests of even those who draft them and
lobby for their adoption.").
340. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1026 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
affd, 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
341. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (E.D.
Ky. 2003), rev'd, No. 03-5400, 2004 WL 2382159 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2004).
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In the end, the above analysis suggests that a more modest, openended entitlement structure would be preferable where an industry is new,
and technology and the market are still evolving.342 In this respect, the
experience of patent law may serve as a useful basis for comparison. The
subject matter of patent law reflects, if anything, a need for even greater
respect for the potential impact of technological change. Yet patent law
has thus far largely resisted efforts at greater statutory specification or
intervention into the market, relying instead on a relatively industry-neutral
property entitlement.343 Commentators in the field have argued for
continued adherence to this model, pointing expressly to copyright as a
cautionary tale.3 "
Thus, ideally, Congress would replace the complex regulatory
framework found in the area of digital content, and in particular digital
music, with a simpler entitlement structure.345 In the context of digital
music, for example, Lydia Loren has suggested scrapping the multiple,
overlapping statutory regimes, and replacing them with a far simpler
entitlement for both musical works and sound recordings.346 David
Nimmer has noted how these absurdly complex provisions could have been
347
avoided with the insertion of a "few judicious words" into the Act.

342. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1376 (suggesting that DMCA was not necessary, and that
pre-existing copyright law was sufficient to address new challenges).
343. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1638-40 (suggesting that, while industryneutral on its face, patent law is industry-specific in application by courts).
344. Arti K. Rai explains that:
The perils of legislative action in the area of intellectual property can be seen most
clearly by looking at copyright law. In copyright law (as contrasted with patent law),
Congress has been very active and has created an intricate and dense web of statutory
language. The influence of narrowly focused interest groups-primarily content
providers of various sorts-has been highly visible. Moreover, with respect to at least
some of this legislation, it is difficult to argue that a fair-minded policymaker who had
listened to all arguments on how best to promote innovation would have reached the
conclusions reached by Congress.
Rai, supra note 281, at 1130. See also Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1637-38 ("The copyright
model-in which industry-specific rules and exceptions have led to a bloated, impenetrable
statute that reads like the tax code-is hardly one patent law should emulate."); Leval, supra note
81, at 1050 (lamenting the decline of copyright's "highly successful partnership of legislative and
judicial lawmaking").
345. See generally LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at 29 (arguing that the
complexity of copyright rules makes them unsuitable); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS
& THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 221-23 (2000) (arguing the DMCA needs to be clarified and made
more precise), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/0309064996/html/221.html#pagetop (last
visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
346. Loren, supra note 8, at 678, 716-19.
347. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1335 (describing how Congress could have avoided
creating the DPRSRA mess by simply adding a few words).
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Indeed, the Register of Copyright herself has recently suggested the
3 48
possibility of abolishing certain compulsory licenses for recorded music.
Much of the existing regulatory structure is the historical result of various
political compromises, largely untethered from underlying substantive
support. Other portions, such as the AHRA, have largely been bypassed
and rendered irrelevant by changing technology. Replacing the existing,
complex statutory structure with a simpler entitlement would give industry
participants far more flexibility in structuring the market in response to
changes in technology and consumer demand, leaving the courts to adjust
the entitlement in a case-by-case fashion in response to changing
conditions.349
Similarly, the above analysis suggests that Congress should modify
the DCMA to bring it more within a property-based regime. Although the
structure of the DMCA is not facially inconsistent with a property-based
approach, it departs from a property rights model in both its interference in
technology markets and the absence of flexibility in adapting the statute to
potential changes in the market. Given the lack of a sound empirical basis
for the legislation, repealing the DMCA would enable markets to develop
and provide specific examples of regulatory need, which could then be
targeted and addressed. Absent a repeal, Congress should at least modify
the statute to give courts some flexibility to adapt the statute to new and
For example, a fair use defense to
unanticipated circumstances.
circumvention liability would inject some much needed flexibility into the
statute.3 50 By permitting some flexible, judicial development of the law,
such a change would bring the DMCA more firmly into the property rights
approach and reduce the risks of lock-in associated with detailed statutory
provisions."'
348. Section 115 of the Copyright Act. In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13 (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) ("I
believe that the time has come to again consider whether there is really a need for such a
compulsory license."). Robert Merges has long suggested that various compulsory licenses in the
music context are unnecessary given the ability of private collective rights organizations to
address the problem of transactions costs. See Merges, supra note 86, at 1295. One could
usefully distinguish between relatively simple compulsory licenses, such as the mechanical
license, which are relatively easy to administer, and the more complex licenses, for example
under the DPRSRA, which are unduly complex, difficult to administer, and of doubtful utility as
a matter of copyright policy.
349. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 330, at 1 ("The influence costs associated with compulsory
Private
licensing schemes make them a more expensive mechanism for setting prices.
negotiations are much cheaper and more flexible over the long term.").
350. See, e.g., H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing codification of the fair use defense
in the digital entertainment context).
351. At least one court has attempted to inject such flexibility into the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc. 381 F.3d 1178,
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Although a return to a more industry-neutral property rights regime in
these areas would perhaps be ideal, it may be unrealistic to expect any such
return, at least on a broad scale.35 This is for the very reasons, discussed
above, that have led to the increasingly regulatory nature of copyright law
in the first place. To the extent that the regulatory turn is the result of
industry compromise and rent-seeking,353 it is highly unlikely that the
regulated industries will be willing to revisit and upend settled
arrangements.3 54 Thus, as a practical matter, many of these complex
provisions are probably here to stay3 55 absent some significant change in
the political landscape.356
At the very least, however, Congress should be reluctant to extend the
regulatory approach (at least in its current, inflexible form) to other areas
involving digital technology. Congress should thus be reluctant to enact
the more recently proposed bills, such as the Hollings bill, that would
intervene into the structure and details of the digital copyright markets.
Similarly, provisions like the broadcast flag should be suspect, as they
attempt to impose technological requirements on a nascent market. Again,
the basic idea is that we currently do not have sufficient information about
future technology or market structures, and a more neutral property
entitlement would provide greater flexibility and permit the parties to
organize the production of copyrighted works flexibly.
1201-03 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
352. But see Nimmer, supra note I, at 1374 (arguing that "[i]t is not too late to turn back").
353. See supra Parts IIand 1II.A.
354. See Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13-14 (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Coyrights) ("As
a matter of principle, I believe that the Section 115 license should be repealed and that licensing
of rights should be left to the marketplace, most likely by means of collective administration. But
I recognize that many parties with stakes in the current system will resist this proposal and that
there would be many practical difficulties in implementing it.").
355. Menell agrees:
Copyright law has entered a new phase in which the government will play a more central
and ongoing role in the implementation of copyright protection. As the broad array of
groups interested in copyright law become more politically active and as technology
advances, Congress Will increasingly delegate authority to regulatory bodies and
administrative officials will take on important roles in the implementation of complex
standards as technology evolves. Content and technology industry associations will need
to learn the art of compromise and copyright lawyers will need to learn a lot more about
administrative law as this new era unfolds.
Menell, supra note 7, at 197.
356. It is perhaps still possible that the absurdly complex scheme governing music copyrights,
combined with increased consumer awareness of and interest in such issues, could lead to a form
of regulatory failure and increased pressure for dramatic change. To some extent, some of the
more radical proposals for reforming music copyrights may be relying upon this scenario for
implementation.
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The analysis here also casts doubt on the various levy proposals that
some commentators have advanced as a response to the problem of digital
copying.357 As discussed above, these proposals push the degree of
intervention to the next level,"' requiring the government to more
extensively regulate both the relevant copyright industries and related
The informational
consumer electronics and services industries.
requirements of this type of legislation are quite high. An extensive
discussion of the merits of these proposals is beyond the scope of this
Article. At the very least, however, the analysis in this Article suggests
that the increasingly regulatory nature of these proposals should be a
significant consideration in assessing their merits.
More generally, the analysis suggests that Congress should be more
selective in applying and extending the regulatory approach to new
situations. Now that the institutional structure to support a regulatory
approach has been created, the temptation exists to unthinkingly apply this
structure to new situations without adequately assessing the costs and
benefits. However, as the analysis above shows, although the regulatory
approach may hold advantages for some industries, it may be extremely illsuited for others. Congress should thus, in the copyright context, be more
conscious of the various regulatory tools it has at its disposal and more
carefully consider which tools may be appropriate for a given situation,
based on the considerations set forth above.
B.

How to Improve

If regulatory copyright is here to stay, at least in some form, the next
question is how we can improve upon it. As discussed above, the
regulatory approach to copyright has been implemented without taking full
advantage of its potential benefits. This suggests that an opportunity exists
for the function of regulatory copyright to be improved. How might
copyright look if we took the regulatory approach seriously and applied
insights that have been gleaned from other areas of administrative law?
More specifically, how might the function of regulatory copyright be
improved to increase the possibility of sound copyright policies and
accurately reflect the interests of the full range of participants?
The discussion below attempts to provide some tentative answers to
these questions. Some of the suggestions would require a rather dramatic
reconfiguration of existing legal structures and might well be unrealistic as
357. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6 at 199-258 (proposing a similar compulsory license);
Netanel, supra note 258, at 4 (proposing that a noncommercial use levy be imposed on the sale of
any consumer product or service, the value of which is substantially increased by peer-to-peer file
sharing).
358. See supra Part II.C.6.
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a political matter. Moreover, the full implications of these suggestions are
not completely worked out. However, the goal of this Section is less to
offer specific next steps as to try to expand upon the universe of possible
regulatory and institutional responses to the issue of legislative complexity,
and to assess whether these would be improvements over the status quo.
1. Substantive Rulemaking Authority
One possible response would be to give the Copyright Office, or some
other appropriate agency, greater substantive authority to regulate in areas
involving complex and dynamic issues. A traditional justification for
agency involvement has been the greater expertise that an agency can bring
to bear on a complex issue."' Thus, Congress delegates to the EPA the
authority to make complex decisions involving environmental policy
because it is better equipped to weigh the complex scientific and economic
issues involved in such decisions. Another justification has been that
regulation is comparatively more flexible than legislation, and can
therefore better respond to changing circumstances. 3" Thus, the EPA can
subsequently revisit issues if the underlying facts or science have changed
in the interim.
The Copyright Office's regulatory authority has historically been
limited to issues relating to its ministerial functions, such as registration
and deposit. However, the recent trend, as demonstrated above, has been to
give the Office, or more accurately the Librarian of Congress with advice
from the Office, ever more regulatory authority, and the analysis here
suggests that this trend could be formalized and made more express. Since
1976, the Office has exercised rulemaking power in connection with its
administration of compulsory licenses.3 61 It has also taken on a more robust
role conducting studies and advising Congress on copyright policy.362 And
more recently, it has it been given limited substantive rulemaking authority,
in crafting exemptions to the DMCA.363
These expansions of regulatory authority suggest that the Copyright

359. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 264, § 1.4.
360. Id.; see also Menell, supra note 7, at 196-97 (suggesting that this also facilitates
resolution of conflicting claims by multiple interest groups).
361. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 969 F.2d 1154, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(affirming the validity of the Copyright Office's rule awarding interest on late payments for cable
compulsory license).
362. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORTS, at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ (last
visited Nov. 22, 2004) (providing a list of recent reports and studies) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
363. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2000). Formal authority to issue the regulations rests with
the Librarian of Congress, although the Copyright Office plays a significant role in making
recommendations and administering the rulemaking procedure.
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Office is potentially equipped to take on a more active regulatory role,
where warranted. For example, the Copyright Office has conducted two
rulemakings under its DMCA authority.3" It has accepted and responded
to public comments and has issued regulations. Although there has been
much debate over the specific content of these exemptions,365 the process
itself functioned relatively smoothly.366 It permitted more public input into
the policymaking process, via notice and comment, than parties otherwise
would have had before Congress. It permitted the Copyright Office to
apply its expertise directly to the issue, rather than indirectly, via a report to
Congress. And even though the Copyright Office ultimately rejected many
of the comments, it issued a written report responding to each comment and
articulating its reasons. 367 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
process permitted the Copyright Office to adjust the law as conditions in
this very dynamic market changed.368 While far from perfect, the process
had these concrete benefits as a way of more flexibly implementing
copyright policy in a dynamic environment.
The DMCA rulemaking process thus suggests that Congress might
consider increasing and formalizing the level of substantive discretion
given to the Copyright Office in certain areas. With specific respect to the
DMCA rulemaking, much frustration with the process had to do with the
Copyright Office's limited interpretation of the scope of the statutory grant
of authority to craft exemptions.3 69 The statute stated that the Office could
exempt "classes of works" for which access was reduced, and the Office
plausibly interpreted this provision to mean that it could not exempt
specific uses of works. The Office thus rejected many proposals that were,

364. See 37 C.F.R. § 201 (2003).
365. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The
Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 282 (2001) ("Short of a decision by Congress to scrap the
whole idea of the DMCA, the likelihood that the Copyright Office would see itself as having
much freedom to use the exclusion provision prophylactically seems remote.").
366. This is not to say that the substantive results of the process were optimal. Indeed, as
later pointed out, both increased discretion and expertise would likely have resulted in a better
balance of competing copyright concerns.
367. See RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS IN RM 2002-4,
RULEMAKING ON EXCEPTIONS FROM PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES (2003), available at http://www.

copyright.gov/1201/docs/registers-recommendations.pdf [hereinafter REGISTER 2003 DMCA
RECOMMENDATION] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
368. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b) (2004) (listing exceptions to the prohibition against
circumvention of technological measures) with 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555 (Oct. 27, 2000) (an earlier
list of exceptions).
369. See Zimmerman, supra note 365, at 284 ("Thus, to provide as the only tool available to
the Copyright Office to deal with this set of problems across-the-board exemptions of entire
categories of works does look at least a bit like the legislative equivalent of a somewhat illtempered practical joke.").

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

in its view, use-specific. 37" Thus, although Congress replaced case-by-case
judicial exemptions (such as would be found under the fair use defense)
with a regulatory strategy for dealing with unanticipated changes, it failed
to provide enough discretion. Granting the Office greater authority to
exempt specific uses would have built in more flexibility and permitted the
Office to respond more dynamically to changing technologies.
Similarly, the DMCA would have benefited from extension of
rulemaking authority regarding the scope of many of the express statutory
exemptions to circumvention liability, such as the exemption for encryption
research.37 Although the statutory exemptions were intended to provide
some breathing space for legitimate activities, they have in practice
provided less breathing space than initially envisioned.372 This is not
unexpected, given that Congress was legislating in the absence of concrete
information about what these technologies would look like. Although the
courts may cure some of these problems in the application of the statute,
the cases thus far suggest that they will be deferential to congressional
findings and reluctant to read in broad changes to the highly specific text of
373
the statute.
Granting the Copyright Office greater authority over these exemptions
would have enabled greater flexibility and would have reduced the costs of
these unintended consequences. Although Congress quite clearly made the
conscious choice not to give courts the wide ranging discretion to craft
exemptions, giving such authority to the Copyright Office would have at
least built in some flexibility while exerting greater control over discretion.
Rulemaking thus presents an intermediate step, between those two
extremes.374
Giving the Office regulatory authority over exemptions would also
have established a mechanism through which the regulated parties could
seek clarification of the statute, rather than waiting for judicial decisions,
which have been slow in coming. Another complaint frequently leveled at
370. REGISTER 2003 DMCA RECOMMENDATION, supra note 367, at 11-13, 82-86.
371. Some drafts of the DMCA would have given even more rulemaking authority to the
Department of Commerce. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-551 (II) (1998) (giving the Department
of Commerce authority to promulgate anti-circumvention regulations).
372. See Liu, supra note 336, at 509-12 (reviewing the various criticisms of the DMCA's
encryption research exception).
373. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-44 (2d Cir. 2001)
(rejecting a narrow interpretation of the anti-trafficking and anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA); Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1184 (E.D. Mo.
2004) (narrowly interpreting reverse engineering privilege). But see Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (crafting a "rule of reason" for
anti-circumvention liability).
374. Indeed, earlier versions of the DMCA would have given the Department of Commerce a
larger regulatory role over circumvention liability. See supra note 371.
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the exemptions is the vagueness of their terms.375 In particular, encryption
researchers have argued that the exemptions subject them to much
uncertainty, thereby chilling legitimate research. A number of threatened
cases against researchers indicate that this fear is not illusory.376

At the

same time, clarification from the courts has not been forthcoming.
Providing a regulatory mechanism would permit parties to affirmatively
seek clarification, rather than wait for a judicial decision.
A similar approach could be extended to other areas involving
technological change. For example, had Congress granted the Copyright
Office more authority to adapt the AHRA more flexibly to changing
technology, it might not have become a dead letter.377 Similarly, the
DPRSRA could have made greater use of the expertise and flexibility of
the Copyright Office. Currently, the Copyright Office's role has been
largely limited to administering the rate-setting process, which has been a
significant undertaking. Congress could, however, have also given the
Librarian of Congress greater discretion over the substantive provisions of
the DPRSRA itself. This would have reduced the complexity of the act
and, at the same time, built a degree of flexibility into the substantive
provisions of the DPRSRA, to permit the law to adapt to the dynamic and
changing market environment. Indeed, the Register of Copyrights has
recently testified regarding her limited regulatory ability to address
substantive problems with the Act.378
More broadly, we could even imagine extension of regulatory
authority over other, more general portions of the Copyright Act. For
example, rather than enacting specific industry exemptions to copyright

375. See Liu, supra note 336, at 509 ("Since passage of the DMCA, many legal and scientific
commentators have criticized the exemptions for being both too narrow and too vague, thereby
chilling legitimate scientific encryption research.").
376. Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 01-CV-2669 (Nov. 28, 2001), at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA?Felten_RIAA (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (declaratory judgment
action brought by computer science professor) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
377. Putting aside whether AHRA was good policy from the outset.
378. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, stated:
With respect to problems involving the requirement that licensees give notice to
copyright owners of their intention to use the compulsory license, I believe that I have
exhausted the limits of my regulatory authority with the notice of proposed rulemaking
published today. With respect to problems involving the scope and treatment of
activities covered by the Section 115 compulsory license, I may soon be able to resolve
some of the issues in the pending rulemaking on incidental digital phonorecord
deliveries, but it seems clear that legislation will be necessary in order to create a truly
workable solution to all of the problems that have been identified.
Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the Subconn. on
Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 13 (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).
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liability, Congress could delegate to the Copyright Office the authority to
promulgate additional exemptions via regulation. Thus, the Copyright
Office could issue detailed provisions governing what types of uses of
copyrighted works would be exempt from liability. These exemptions
could respond to the perceived needs of the market. Rather than relying on
the vagaries of fair use or waiting for a judicial decision, parties could
petition for rulemakings that would address their specific industries and
provide concrete guidance about what uses would be permitted.
Alternatively, the Office could be given the power to promulgate safe
harbors or issue persuasive interpretive rulings.
Thus, for example, one could imagine r'egulations for such uses as
music sampling, or documentary filmmaking. There could be a threshold
level of economic significance before a rulemaking would be warranted, to
ensure that agency time was not consumed with relatively small issues.
Moreover, fair use would still be necessary to provide a safety valve for
new and unanticipated uses, as even a more flexible regulatory regime
would be unable to completely specify all of the uses of copyrighted works
that should be exempt.379 However, exemption through regulation could
perhaps usefully fill a gap currently left by the relative lack of guidance
from fair use doctrine, and provide additional guidance and certainty to
industries that routinely encounter difficult fair use issues.
There are some indications that Congress is already moving down the
path of delegating more regulatory authority to the Copyright Office and
Librarian of Congress. The DMCA rulemaking is one example. Moreover,
certain recent bills in Congress have indicated a greater willingness on the
part of Congress to delegate such authority to the Copyright Office. For
example, in introducing the Musical Licensing Reform Act of 1996, which
would have given the Copyright Office discretion to define the terms of an
exemption, Senator Orrin Hatch expressly noted that the Copyright Office
was better placed to set these terms and to change them over time in
response to changing circumstances.38 Future proposed bills, such as
database legislation, might also benefit from the additional flexibility and
expertise offered by an administrative approach.38 1
379. Admittedly, one risk of this approach would be to supplant fair use entirely with a less
flexible system, as was effectively done with the DMCA.
380. See 142 CONG. REC. S2193 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The
Copyright Office is in a much better position than Congress is to study the business practices that
prevail in order to identify improvements that would make these practices fairer and more
efficient."); Marybeth Peters, The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S.
Copyright Office, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25, 43-44 (1996) (quoting and
approving a similar statement by Senator Hatch).
381. See, e.g., Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Against Theft and Expropriation
(PIRATE) Act of 2004, S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing to amend chapter 5 of Title 17 to
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At the same time, recent experience also cautions against delegating
such authority without making significant changes to the structure of the
Copyright Office to ensure that it is equipped to fulfill this increased role.
For example, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee recently asked
the Copyright Office to assist in the drafting of the proposed Inducing
Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004 (INDUCE Act).382 The Copyright
Office was to provide a forum for various affected interests to discuss their
concerns and then offer recommendations for revising the Act.383 In
practice, however, the process offered only a limited window of
opportunity for discussion and permitted only relatively limited access to
specific industry participants.384 If the Copyright Office is to take on this
increased policymaking role, changes would need to be made to give the
Copyright Office needed expertise and to open up the process more fully to
a wide range of interests. These structural changes are discussed in more
detail below.
In many ways, this trend toward more regulatory authority should not
be surprising. As copyright law begins to intervene more deeply into the
structure of complex and dynamic markets, we would expect and want
more authority to be delegated to an administrative agency, just as is the
case in other areas of complex federal law. The history of copyright itself
nicely tracks this progression. The first compulsory license set the royalty
rate inflexibly in the statute, and left it unchanged for several decades.
More recent compulsory licenses have built in flexibility by permitting
administrative bodies to adjust and set the rates. The next logical step is to
grant increasing discretion not just over rates, but also substantive legal
provisions, as these are also subject to many of the same pressures for
change. After all, where markets are dynamic, the underlying market
failures will also likely be dynamic, and a regulatory regime needs to have
the flexibility to adjust over time.
Of course, there would have to be some substantive limit on the
amount of discretion granted to the Copyright Office.
A blanket
authorization to "promote the public interest" would certainly shorten the
existing Copyright Act, but would entail tremendous administrative costs
and provide little substantive guidance. Thus, extension of increased
authorize copyright enforcement by the Attorney General).
382. S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004).
383. Letter from Senators Bill Frist, et al. to Marybeth Peters (Aug. 13, 2004), at http://www.
corante.com/importance/archives/Letter to -MaryBethPeters.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
384. Id.; see also Letter from Association of American Universities, et al. to Senators Orrin
Hatch and Patrick Leahy (Sept. 17, 2004), at http://www.corante.com/importance/archives/
INDUCELetterSep_17.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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regulatory authority to the Copyright Office should continue to be
incremental.
However, this type of authority should be expressly
acknowledged and formalized within the Office, and policymakers should
be on the lookout for other areas where such a flexible approach might
usefully be deployed. This change would need to be supported by
additional institutional commitments, as discussed more fully below.385
2. Adjudicatory and Enforcement Authority
The extension of the regulatory model would not necessarily be
limited to rulemaking. Once we take seriously the idea of the Copyright
Office as an administrative agency, we open up the possibility of the Office
taking on both increased adjudicatory and enforcement functions. The
Copyright Office already has some adjudicatory power. Specifically, it
hears appeals from denials of registrations. 3 86 More significantly, the
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels have the power to resolve disputes
between claimants to the proceeds of various compulsory licenses.387 This
latter power has resulted in a number of very involved adjudicatory
proceedings. 8 8 In these proceedings, the CARPs accept evidence, take
testimony, rule on motions, and act very much like an adjudicatory body.
Thus, the Librarian of Congress, through the Copyright Office and CARPs,
already exercises some adjudicatory authority.
Expressly recognizing the regulatory aspects of copyright law would
lead to greater attention being paid to this adjudicatory function. More
specifically, the CARPs have come under criticism in recent years. Many,
including those in the Copyright Office, have criticized the fact that the
CARPs are ad hoc, and involve the appointment of generalist arbitrators,
who must be educated about the issues.38 9 Recent proposals have been
made to reform the existing process by returning to more permanent

385. Compare Rai, supra note 281, at 1133 (arguing against conferring substantive
rulemaking authority on PTO, given PTO's lack of institutional resources and economic
expertise).
386. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(b) (2000); 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 9.
387. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(3).
388. For some examples, see generally In re Distribution of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997
Cable Royalty Funds, Phase II Cable Royalty Distribution Report, No. 2000-2 CARP CD 93-97
(CARP Apr. 6, 2001), at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/carp/cable.royalty.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); In re Distribution of DART Royalty
Funds For 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, No. 99-3 CARP DD 95-98 (CARP Nov. 17, 2000), at
http://www. copyright.gov/carp/carp95_98.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
389. See Copyright Royalty and DistributionReform Act of 2003: HearingBefore the House
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (Apr. 1, 2003) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights);
Maxey, Note, supra note 183, at 397.
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tribunals.39 ° A more permanent recognition of this regulatory function
would be consistent with the analysis in this Article.
Beyond the existing adjudicatory function, there might be additional
roles that the Copyright Office could fulfill. For example, Mark Lemiley
and R. Anthony Reese have recently advanced an interesting proposal to
reduce the cost of copyright infringement actions against consumers by
giving copyright owners access to a low-cost administrative enforcement
proceeding.3 9' Lemley and Reese do so by enlisting the involvement of the
Copyright Office. Under their proposal, copyright owners would have the
option to pursue an action before an administrative law judge against
consumers who are clearly violating copyright law by uploading significant
numbers of copyrighted works on peer-to-peer networks. Administrative
adjudication could thus reduce enforcement costs while providing some
check on potential abuse of process. Much work would still need to be
done to assess the viability of such a setup, but the basic point is that the
Copyright Office could potentially play a role here.
Similarly, the Office could be given investigative and enforcement
authority, which it now generally lacks.39 Although private enforcement
of copyright infringement is probably the most efficient mechanism, the
Office could play a constructive role in areas where private enforcement
falls short. For example, there could be a stronger role for the Copyright
Office to deal with foreign or offshore infringement, which is difficult for
private actors to reach. This would be a logical extension of its current role
interfacing with foreign countries and international institutions regarding
copyright policy.393 The Office could also play a greater role in obtaining

information about infringers from internet service providers. In this way,
they could reduce the costs of finding infringers while exercising
appropriate oversight over the privacy interests of the involved parties.394
Some administrative enforcement authority by the Copyright Office
could also fill perceived gaps between private civil enforcement and public
criminal enforcement. Although criminal copyright enforcement authority
can be exercised by local U.S. Attorneys' Offices, such actions are quite

390. See, e.g., Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act, H.R. 1417, 108th Cong.
(2003) (proposing to replace the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel with a Copyright Royalty
Judge).
391. Lemley & Reese, supra note 263, at 1413.
392. Cf Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation (PIRATE) Act of
2004, S.2237, 108th Cong. (PIRATE Act) (proposing to expand powers of the Attorney General
to enforce copyright laws).
393. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3) (2000).
394. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229,
1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (interpreting the DMCA to limit the ability of the record industry to
subpoena records of ISP in order to identify peer-to-peer file sharers).
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rightly limited to the most egregious cases of copyright piracy. 95 A
number of recent legislative initiatives, however, have sought to make
greater use of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices in enforcing copyright, by
increasing funding and giving them the ability to bring civil suits. 396 As
others have pointed out, this seems like a rather inefficient use of
Providing some administrative enforcement
government resources.
authority might be a more cost-effective and centrally coordinated way to
bridge the gap.
3. Increasing Expertise and Representation
The proposals above represent a departure from the Copyright
Office's historical role, albeit one that is already in progress. Moreover,
the advisability of some of these specific proposals depends on the
specifics of the particular situation, and much additional work would need
to be done before concluding that they should be implemented. The basic
point, however, is that once we begin thinking more fully about the
regulatory nature of existing copyright law, we open up a broader range of
institutional responses to administer our complex copyright law.

This

Article is less concerned about the specific proposals, and more concerned
with opening up this area to further consideration.397
In order to fulfill an increased policymaking role, significant changes

395. But see PIRATE Act, S.2237 (seeking to expand such powers).
396. See id.
397. An interesting and important question arises about the ability of the Copyright Office to
constitutionally take on this role. See E. Fulton Brylawski, The Copyright Office: A
Constitutional Confrontation, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1975); JeanAne Marie Jiles,
Comment, Copyright Protection in the New Millennium: Amending the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act to Prevent Constitutional Challenges, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 443, 454-55 (2000)
(suggesting that DMCA rulemaking authority may be unconstitutional). The Copyright Office is
an arm of the Library of Congress, and the Register of Copyrights is appointed by the Librarian of
Congress. Although the Library of Congress sits formally within the legislative branch, see, for
example, Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d 733, 736 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
that the Copyright Office forms part of the legislative branch), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); U.S. v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 833 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (stating that the Copyright Office is not an executive "agency" for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001), the Librarian of Congress is appointed by the President subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate. At least one federal circuit court has held that the Librarian is an "officer of the
United States" under Article II, and may therefore exercise rulemaking authority without
violating separation of powers concerns. See Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.
1978); Raffi Zerounian, Bonneville Int'l v. Peters, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47, 62 (2002). But
see C.H. Dobal, Note, A Proposal to Amend the Cable Compulsory License Provisions of the
1976 CopyrightAct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 720 (1988) (arguing that Eltra is suspect in light of
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)). A full discussion of this topic is outside the scope of
this Article. However, if the Copyright Office were not constitutionally able to take on a more
extensive policymaking role, then Congress would clearly have to move both existing and future
substantive powers to an independent or executive agency.
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would need to be made to the Copyright Office's structure and makeup.39
The Copyright Office currently does not have sufficient resources or
expertise to take on a substantially more robust policymaking role, not to
mention the more significant proposals advanced above. A look at the
current organizational structure of the Office reveals that most of the
individuals working in the Office are dedicated to the historical functions
of that office, namely registration, deposit, and other ministerial tasks.399
Comparatively fewer resources are devoted to policymaking.
If the Office is to be expected to engage in a more robust
policymaking role, then the staff would benefit from more expertise.
Specifically, increased economic expertise would be vital, given the
economic underpinnings of copyright policy. In addition, as copyright law
becomes more industry-specific, a greater familiarity with specific
regulated industries would be warranted. Thus, we would expect greater
specialization within the Copyright Office itself, corresponding to the
industries being regulated.
In addition, copyright law generally, like many other areas of
intellectual property law, is characterized by insufficient empirical data.
Such data would be invaluable both for the Office itself and for Congress
more generally. Moreover, objective data would reduce both the Office's
and Congress's dependency upon the regulated industries for information
about those industries. The Office could thus play a very constructive role
in helping to collect and create the kind of empirical data necessary for
informed copyright policy. While it is true that the Office has already
played this role in various circumstances,4 "° additional resources would
help it fulfill this role more effectively.
Similarly, the Office would benefit from greater technological
Copyright markets have been characterized by dramatic
expertise.
technological change, and the advent of digital technology has increased

398. See FY 2004 Budget Request: Hearing on Legislative Branch AppropriationsBefore the
Senate Comm. On Appropriations, 108th Cong., 65-66 (2003) (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights) ("As such, our policy and regulatory work in this area is both
increasingly technical and often contentious.").
399. See Marybeth Peters, The Year In Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S.
Copyright Office, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25, 25-26 (1996) ("The bulk of
what we do is paperwork: we registered over 700,000 claims in works last year, and recorded
documents concerning transfers of ownership and security interest, of which there were over
17,000 with several hundred thousand titles."). Note that this role is increasingly automated. Id.
at 46-47.
400. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 8-17 (2001) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights)
(presenting findings on the effects of the DMCA).
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the rate of change dramatically.40 1 Greater technical expertise is therefore
essential for informed policy. For example, much copyright policy
depends upon assessments of the efficacy of attempts to protect
copyrighted works via technology. Without technical expertise, the risk
exists that policy will be made based on faulty assumptions. This Article
has already detailed several examples where Congress has regulated based
Having
on faulty predictions or assumptions about technology.4 2
technologists on staff would increase the possibility of informed
policymaking.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, steps would need to be taken to
ensure that a wide range of stakeholders has real access to the
policymakers. One common critique of the Copyright Office has been the
extent to which it has largely backed the interests of copyright holders over
the interests of consumers more generally.40 3 As discussed in more detail
below, the public-regarding nature of the Copyright Office has sometimes
been underestimated. At the same time, it is easy to see how the Office
might feel particularly attuned to the interests of copyright holders, as
copyright holders are the main consumers of the Copyright Office's
historic function in registering copyrights and administering compulsory
licenses. Given this practical tie, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Office
might feel particularly aligned with copyright owners. Moreover, the lack
of independent expertise documented above makes the Office even more
dependent upon the industries for information about markets and
technologies.
As Jessica Litman has noted, copyright legislation is
generally subject to interest group pressure, and it is easy to see how this
could translate into industry capture of a regulatory body.4"
Given the above, additional steps would need to be taken to ensure
that the policymaking process represents the full range of copyright
interests. In part, this might naturally occur with an expansion of the
Copyright Office's duties, insofar as the range of constituents directly
petitioning the Office would expand. Similarly, by including more
technologists and economists on the staff, a wider range of perspectives
would be introduced. At the same time, affirmative steps should be taken
to ensure that other interests representing the public at large (e.g., public
interest groups, librarians, educators, academics, etc.) are fully represented.
The public charge of the Copyright Office should be expressly directed at
401. See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 6, at 2200-01.
402. See supra Part lI.C.2-.C.4.
403. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
29, 53-54 (1994) ("The office has, of course, some history of being 'captured' by industry for
most of the usual reasons .... ").
404. See Litman, supra note 68, at 881.
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broader copyright goals, rather than at preserving or encouraging a specific
copyright industry. Finally, the appointment of the Register should be
subject to the same kinds of political considerations found in the
appointment of other administrative agencies with policymaking power.4 °5
By increasing the expertise of the Copyright Office, granting it more
substantive authority, and ensuring that a wide range of copyright interests
are represented, these reforms would ideally place more emphasis on the
Copyright Office as a nexus of coherent copyright policymaking.
Currently, the existing institutional structure lacks a strong, informed,
centralized policymaking body. The complexity of existing copyright
markets makes it difficult for courts to grapple with these issues,406 and has
increasingly made it difficult even for Congress to deal with. And although
the Copyright Office has at least some expertise, it is, as this Article has
argued, underutilized. Thus, the hope would be that, by making these
changes, at least one institution would exist with both the institutional
competence and authority to make informed, consistent, and rational
copyright policy.40 7
The increased substantive responsibilities of the Copyright Office
would have the added benefit of fostering public awareness about copyright
issues and providing a forum for public debate. Although the Copyright
Office currently plays this role to some extent (particularly with respect to
education), increasing its authority and making it a more central player in
the administration of the copyright scheme would permit it to more
effectively educate the public on matters of copyright policy and encourage
informed debate about contentious copyright issues.
4. Institutional Alternatives
Although the above discussion has proceeded on the assumption that
the Copyright Office would be the agency charged with this increased
regulatory role, it is worth exploring alternative institutional structures.
One possibility would be to vest these increased duties in a different

405. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 173-98 (suggesting different mechanisms for avoiding
industry capture).
406. Note that there is no specialized court for copyright cases analogous to the Federal
Circuit in patent cases. See Rai, supra note 281, at 1040 (describing the Federal Circuit as a
policymaking body).
407. A more centralized and effective focus of copyright policy might also have the added
benefit of reducing the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. The passage of the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, for example, was largely secured, after an initial defeat,
by lobbying for similar requirements to be placed in the WIPO treaties. See LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT, supra note 3, at 89-150. Similarly, other bodies such as the Department of
Commerce, PTO, and FCC provide alternatives for copyright interests to lobby for favorable
regulation.
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administrative agency. As noted above, the Library of Congress is not a
traditional executive branch agency. The Copyright Office is thus not
structured to immediately take on the additional duties of a traditional
administrative agency. Moreover, lingering constitutional issues surround
the delegation of such authority to an Article I agency.4 °8 Vesting
jurisdiction over copyright matters in an existing executive branch agency
might solve both of these problems.
For example, the FCC has recently begun to exercise some influence
on copyright issues dealing with the broadcast industries, through its
broadcast flag rulemaking. 4°
The limited jurisdiction of the FCC,
however, makes it an unappealing candidate, as it has no authority over
many copyright industries, such as publishing, recorded music, software,
fine arts, etc. Moreover, the FCC lacks any existing expertise over
copyright issues and has historically focused on a very different set of
regulatory concerns. Indeed, some have sharply criticized the FCC's recent
foray into copyright concerns on precisely these grounds.41
Perhaps a better candidate would be the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO). In the mid-1990s, there was some discussion of possibly bringing
the Copyright Office within the ambit of the PTO, in order to consolidate
the U.S. government's intellectual property policy function. a In the end,
this proposal did not get off the ground. Whether such a change would be
appealing is difficult to say. On the one hand, it would increase the chance
of coherent intellectual property policies, at least to the extent that such
policies require coordination among the three different bodies of federal
intellectual property law.412 Moreover, such a change would address, to at
least some extent, both the constitutional and institutional competence
concerns raised above.
At the same time, such a change might have drawbacks. As discussed
in more detail below, the historic, public-regarding function of the Library
413
of Congress makes it an appealing body to regulate information policy.
In addition, there may be benefits to dispersing authority over intellectual
property matters as a way of making it more difficult for regulated
industries to completely capture government regulation of intellectual
property matters. In the end, this Article expresses no concrete opinion
408. See supra note 397.

409. See supra Part II.C.5.
410. See Susan Crawford, Nice Work if You Can Get it: The FCC in the Digital Age 52-69

(Aug. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
411. See Pamela Samuelson, Will The Copyright Office Be Obsolete In The Twenty-First
Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 61-64 (1994) (considering the creation of an

Office of Intellectual Property Policy).
412. See id. at 62.
413. See id. at 63--64.
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over which agency would best be suited for the task. Rather the main point
is simply to raise the possibility that some agency could usefully play a
more robust role in setting and implementing copyright policy.
A less radical alternative to an administrative agency might be an
impartial expert body or commission. To the extent that a significant
failure of the current regulatory approach results from the lack of expert
input, this could be addressed without the creation of an additional
administrative agency. Thus, for example, an expert body like the old
Office of Technology Assessment could serve a useful role assessing the
implications of technological change.4" 4 The history of copyright law
contains at least one successful example of such an approach, namely
CONTU. As discussed above, CONTU was expressly charged with the
task of studying the impact of new technologies on copyright markets.4" 5 It
commissioned a number of detailed expert studies on specific copyright
issues, and later issued specific recommendations (backed by a report and
dissenting opinions).4" 6 Congress then adopted a number of these specific
recommendations.417 David Nimmer, in particular, has recently argued that
CONTU provides a model for more coherent and effective copyright
legislation.4" 8
An expert, impartial body like CONTU would address some but not
all of the above flaws with the existing regulatory approach. Although it
would certainly inject much needed expertise into the regulatory process, it
would depend very much on Congress's willingness to listen to and
implement its suggestions. Interest group pressures may at times outweigh
the persuasive authority of such a body's recommendations. In addition,
such a body would rely upon legislation for implementation of its
recommendations, and thus would not have the ability to flexibly adapt
rules to changing circumstances, as might be the case with an
administrative agency. At the same time, however, such a body would be
more insulated from direct political pressure, and thus its recommendations
could more accurately reflect sound (or at least coherent) copyright policy.
At the very least, the commission model provides a less intrusive
alternative to the administrative agency approach proposed above.419
414. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA (Aug.
2004), at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5738&sequence=0 (last visited Nov. 22,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
415. See supra Part II.C.I.
416. See Nimmer, supra note 1, at 1258-59.
417. Id. at 1256-66.
418. Id.at 1378-81.
419. Yet another alternative would be to try to increase the policymaking competence within
Congress itself. For example, in the tax context, much expertise regarding the tax code resides
within the congressional committees (such as Ways and Means or the Joint Committee on
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5. Objections
The proposals above are, naturally, subject to a number of potential
objections. Most seriously, there may be much understandable skepticism
about any proposal that gives additional authority to an administrative
agency. Agencies are of course subject to their own flaws. They are
conventionally viewed as being far less accountable to the public, as
administrators are unelected.
Thus, there are concerns about both
legitimacy and responsiveness to the public. In addition, there exists the
risk that the agency may become captured by the industries being
regulated.42 ° And regulation by an agency normally results in even greater
complexity in the structure of regulation, thereby increasing costs and
raising barriers to competition. Indeed, for many of these reasons, the tide
over the past several years has generally turned against additional
delegation of authority to agencies.
Already, there are some examples of Congress using the regulatory
process to shield itself from having to make difficult choices. For example,
the DMCA exemption rulemaking power could be viewed, not as a
praiseworthy attempt to build in flexibility into a new regulatory structure,
but as an attempt to give the illusion of flexibility while in fact restricting
the discretion given to the Librarian of Congress in order to further the
interests of the copyright industries.42
Similarly, the provision in the
DMCA requiring the Copyright Office to study the impact of the DMCA
on encryption research422 is also somewhat suspect, in light of the fact that
the report was due before the relevant provisions of the DMCA were to go
into effect.423 Thus, there is a very real danger that increasing regulatory
oversight may simply exacerbate existing problems. 2 4

Taxation) themselves and their extensive staffs. Although the various Judiciary committees
(where most copyright legislation originates) currently have some such expertise, one alternative
to the above would be to increase such expertise.
420. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 44 (1991) (discussing the effects of private interests on governmental
decisionmaking); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 128 (1971) (stating that
politicians remain cognizant of pleasing powerful interest groups to avoid organized protest to an
unfavorable regulation); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565-70 (1992) (describing the mechanism of agency capture);
Georg8 J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 9-10
(1971) (stating that many industries are able to circumvent the political process and employ
agencies to further industry goals).
421. See Zimmerman, supra note 365, at 282-89.
422. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(5)(A)'(2000).
423. See Liu, supra note 336, at 517.
424. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman explains that:
Faced with forcefully expressed objections from the library, research and academic
communities to this new form of "paracopyright" protection, Congress added a few
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I am quite aware of these drawbacks and therefore make these
proposals with some hesitancy. Yet there are, I believe, reasons for
thinking that these objections may not be dispositive.425 While agencies are
indeed more shielded from the public, there are reasons to believe that the
Copyright Office in particular would be relatively more responsive to the
public interest, particularly if modified as discussed in more detail above.
Part of this is historical. The Copyright Office sits within the Library of
Congress, and the charge of the Library of Congress is rather unique. 426 Its
goal is the production and preservation of knowledge for the greater benefit
of the public. This charge may have the effect of making the Copyright
Office more public-regarding, certainly more so than an agency that is
more closely aligned with the industries being regulated.4 27 For example, a
Copyright Office situated in the Department of Commerce would likely
look quite different. If a governmental body were to be entrusted with
substantive copyright policy, it is hard to imagine a more public-regarding
42
government body than the Library of Congress. 1
In addition, the track record of the Copyright Office offers some
reason for hope. Although subject to much criticism from all sides, the
Copyright Office has at times been public-regarding within the limits in
which it is operating, and certainly more so than Congress. While it is true
that in certain reports and positions, the Office has expressed some
sympathy with claims for strong protection favoring existing copyright
interests,429 in other cases, the Office has recognized the need for weaker
provisions to the DMCA, ostensibly designed to soften the impact of the statute on these
Unfortunately, however, the provisions were
users' reasonable needs for access.
designed in such a way that made it doubtful from the outset that they would actually be
able to deliver much of the relief that was supposedly intended.
Zimmerman, supra note 365, at 281.
425. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 18, at 1406 ("Contrary to the theory
popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, agencies do not always behave as the hopeless captives
of their client industries."); David B. Spence, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the
Regulatory State: A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 436
(2002) (noting that agencies commonly avoid capture).
426. See U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE MISSION AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES OF THE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FY 1997-2004, at http://www.loc.gov/ndl/mission.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2004) ("The Library's mission is to make its resources available and useful to the
Congress and the American people, and to sustain and preserve a universal collection of
knowledge and creativity for future generations.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
427. See Samuelson, supra note 411, at 67-68; Eric Schwartz, The Role Of The Copyright
Office In The Age Of Information, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69, 78-79 (1994); cf Rai,
supra note 281, at 1133 ("[T]he PTO appears to have developed an institutional culture that treats
patentees as 'clients' to be served rather than as claimants who must present a case for being
entitled to a patent.").
428. See Litman, supra note 403, at 53-54 (arguing that Copyright Office is best positioned to
be the public's copyright lawyer).
429. See generally Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 989 et al.
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protection and more balance in the Copyright Act.430 In other areas, the
Office has proposed reasonable changes that would add to the balance.431
The Office has certainly expressed a greater concern with overall
coherence of the copyright laws. Thus, there may be good reason to
believe that the Copyright Office would be somewhat public-regarding.
And it could be argued that its ability to be more public-regarding might
well be increased with more expertise, resources, and authority.
To that end, concrete steps would need to be taken to ensure sufficient
public input into and control over the regulatory process. The Copyright
Office should be required to gather public input before engaging in
substantive policy making. Notice and comment should be taken very
seriously.43 2 The full range of checks and balances should be imported
from other areas of administrative law. In addition, appointment and
confirmation of the Librarian of Congress should be subject to the same
kinds of considerations as appointments of other heads of administrative
agencies with substantive authority. Additional steps could be taken to
ensure a wide representation of viewpoints, as outlined in the preceding

Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 158 (1995) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights)
(testifying in support of copyright term extension); Pornography, Technology, and Process:
Problems and Solutions on Peer-to-PeerNetworks: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (testifying
in support of broadening the power of the Department of Justice to prosecute infringement on
peer-to-peer networks); Protecting Innovation and Art while Preventing Piracy: Hearing on S.
2560 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights) (testifying in support of the Intentional Inducement of Copyrights
Act of 2004).
430. See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciaryand the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protectionof the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 9-10 (Sept. 23, 2003) (statement of David 0.
Carson, General Counsel, United States Copyright Office) (relaying the Copyright Office's
concern about the risk of overprotection and the perceived need to provide incentives for
production and disbursement of information databases); Sound Recordings as Works Made for
Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 21, 34, 41 (2000) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights)
(stating that the recent "Works For Hire" amendment did not achieve the proper balance in
protecting the right of those involved in creating the work). For a list of official statements and
reports by the Register of Copyright, see http://www.copyright.gov/statements.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
431. See Digital Millennium CopyrightAct (DMCA) Section 104 Report: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong., 15-16 (2001) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (proposing
changes).
432. The activities of the Copyright Office are generally subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000). Note that an earlier version of the
DMCA would have required the exemption rulemaking to be "on the record."
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Sections. 433 These steps, combined with the unique history of the Library
of Congress, would help insure some responsiveness to public opinion.
More generally, the real question is whether Congress would be any
434
better. The analysis here must be a comparative institutional analysis,
and on that front, giving the Copyright Office additional authority,
whatever its drawbacks, would be superior to the status quo. The
alternative to Copyright Office regulation is not no regulation, but instead
regulation by Congress. As demonstrated above, Congress has shown little
hesitancy enacting complex, detailed, and industry-specific legislation. It
has done so with limited expertise, whether economic or technical. It has
locked these provisions inflexibly into the statute. And it has relied heavily
upon the industries being regulated for both information and drafting.
Moreover, public access to legislators has, if anything, been even more
limited than access to the Copyright Office through its rulemaking
procedures. 435 Thus, the existing course charted by Congress exhibits all of
the same flaws, without any of the offsetting benefits of expertise and
flexibility.
Of course, ultimately the course adopted by the Copyright Office will
reflect the desires of Congress. Thus, if Congress is not committed to a
more public-regarding copyright policy, it is unrealistic to expect that the
Copyright Office, or any other kind of institutional restructuring, will be
able to serve as a counterweight to that. And the potential admittedly exists
that Congress could use the regulatory process to shield itself even further
from accountability. However, the argument in this Article is that, at the
very least, greater involvement by the Copyright Office would reduce some
of the potential costs of a regulatory approach, by injecting more expertise
and more flexibility into the legislative process and by providing some
more centralized and comprehensive nexus for copyright policy. The hope
would be that, whatever the substantive goal pursued by Congress (whether
high-protectionist or low-protectionist), increased involvement by an expert
Copyright Office would at least ensure that such goals are pursued in a
relatively coherent, informed, and flexible manner, and that this benefit
would outweigh the risks presented by lack of direct accountability and
further capture.
A final objection is that the proposals here would not solve the
problem of complexity noted at the start of this Article. Rather, the
433. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 186-96 (proposing various mechanisms for ensuring
greater public accountability).
434. See KOMESAR, supra note 265, at 3-13.
435. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify JudicialActivism After All?,
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 223-25 (1997) (comparing costs of seeking legal change from
legislatures versus courts).
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proposals would merely shift the complexity from the U.S. Code to the
Code of Federal Regulations. My response is that reducing complexity is
not the goal of this Article. In fact, this Article assumes that the trend
toward ever-increasing complexity is too advanced to turn back. Rather,
this Article is primarily concerned with the question of how to
appropriately manage this complexity. And on this score, there seem few
attractive alternatives to increasing agency involvement.
CONCLUSION

Copyright law has become more regulatory, and this trend is here to
stay. It is therefore important for us to expressly recognize this fact and
begin to think more carefully about its implications. In particular, we need
to pay more careful attention to questions of institutional design and
support for an increasingly complex and detailed regulatory structure. The
aim of this Article has been to highlight this trend and focus increased
attention upon it.

